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The Criterion of Significance[1]

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A CRITERION OF SIGNIFICANCE IS A STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT A sentence is significant if it satisfies such and such conditions, and that it is meaningless if it does not satisfy the specified conditions. When one examines the various formulations of this criterion, it is not always clear whether the criterion is intended as a definition of the term 'significant sentence,' or whether it is intended as a generalization about significant sentences. If the criterion is intended as a definition the conditions referred to are the defining properties of a significant sentence. Thus, a sentence is often said to be significant if and only if it expresses a proposition. This formulation of the criterion is perhaps intended as a definition of the term "significant sentence," rather than as a generalization about significant sentences. If the criterion is intended as a generalization, it specifies some property that belongs to all significant sentences and only to such sentences. When the criterion of significance is formulated as the thesis that a sentence is significant if and only if it is verifiable, this thesis is perhaps intended as a generalization about significant sentences rather than as a definition.

The formulation of a criterion of significance in the sense of a generalization about significant sentences can get under way only if we already know how to distinguish between significant and meaningless sentences. Assuming that we know how to divide any given group of sentences into significant and meaningless sentences, the initial step in the formulation of this generalization is the ascertainment of the common properties of the sentences in the two groups. And assuming that these have been found, we may next find it possible to select a subset of the common properties of the significant sentences which is not also a subset of the common properties of the meaningless sentences. This subset can then be used in the formulation of a criterion of significance, and any sentence that was not used in the formulation of the criterion can be subjected to the test provided by the criterion. The sentence is significant if it has all the properties belonging to the subset, otherwise meaningless.

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[1]Presidential address delivered before the twenty-third annual meeting of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association at Mills College, Oakland, California, December 27, 28, 29, 1949.

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It is theoretically possible to find a correct generalization of this sort, if we know how to distinguish between significant and meaningless sentences. We can make this distinction if we have a definition of significance, and if we can determine for every sentence whether or not it has the defining properties of a significant sentence. But we can also make this distinction if the notion of significance is taken as primitive. To be sure, it may not be possible to determine by simple inspection whether or not a given sentence is significant. But we may nevertheless be able to make this determination indirectly by showing that the sentence can or cannot be transformed into a significant sentence. The criterion we use in making this determination may be formulated in several alternative ways. (1) A sentence is significant if and only if it is translatable into a significant sentence. (2) A sentence is significant if and only if it is a member of a class of synonymous sentences. (3) A sentence is significant if and only if it is well-formed or transformable into a well-formed sentence. This criterion presupposes that certain sentences are known to be significant. Now if we have a definition of significance or a criterion of the sort just described, we can separate sense from nonsense, and we can next attack the problem of finding a criterion of significance in the sense of a generalization that is true of significant sentences and only of such sentences. If we are successful in finding one or more generalizations of this kind, we can subsequently degrade one of these generalizations to the status of a definition. Once the common properties of significant and meaningless sentences have been ascertained, we may find that the notion of significance is definable, even if our original classification of sentences into significant and meaningless was made on the supposition that significance is a primitive notion.

It would be very desirable if we had a criterion of significance either in the sense of a definition or in the sense of a true generalization about all significant sentences. But such a definition or generalization has not yet been found. It will be maintained in this paper that the criteria of significance that have been proposed suffer from two defects. (1) If they are intended as definitions of significance they are either inadequate or else reducible to the criterion for which significance is a primitive notion. (2) If they are intended as generalizations about the class of significant sentences, they are false. It will be maintained instead that the criterion of significance in its present form amounts, roughly speaking, to the statement that a sentence is significant if and only if

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it is transformable into a significant sentence. This is the criterion which is in fact always used when we seek to determine whether or not a sentence is significant.

In order to see how we arrive at the decision that a sentence is significant or meaningless, let us review first some of the necessary conditions that do not presuppose the notion of significance. For this purpose we need to consider only declarative sentences. Sentences other than declarative may be ignored, because an imperative, optative, or interrogative sentence is significant or meaningless only if its declarative prototype is significant or meaningless. A declarative sentence in a natural language, such as English, is a string of words such that every word, with the possible exception of certain proper names, belongs to the language in question. If the string includes words, aside from proper names, that do not belong to the language, it is not a sentence in that language, unless the definitions of these words have also been supplied, i.e., unless these words can be replaced by their defined equivalents. Though every sentence is a string of words, not every string of words is a sentence, for a sentence may be either grammatical or ungrammatical, and some strings of words are neither. A sentence is ungrammatical if it resembles, in a certain degree, a correctly constructed sentence. How great a departure from the grammatical norm is permissible before a string of words ceases to be an ungrammatical sentence we do not need to decide; we may suppose that any string of words is an acceptable sentence if a grammarian finds it possible to restore it to grammatical correctness. Now, though compliance with the rules of grammar is not a necessary condition of significance, the transformability of an ungrammatical sentence into one that is grammatically sound is a necessary condition of significance. A string of words that fails to satisfy this condition is not a sentence and hence meaningless. In other words, if a sentence is significant, it must be constructed in accordance with the grammatical rules or else it must be transformable into a sentence that satisfies these rules. A string of words may also fail to be a sentence under the foregoing characterization if there is a violation of the rules of orthography. If a string of this nature can not be transformed into a sentence, grammatical or ungrammatical, by restoring the offending words to orthographic perfection, it is meaningless. In other words, if a sentence is significant, the words of the sentence satisfy the rules of orthography or else it is transformable into a sentence whose component words do satisfy these rules.

The two conditions mentioned are, I think, sufficiently trivial to be acceptable as necessary conditions of significance without further argument. These conditions assure us only that a string of words that resists grammatical and orthographic correction is nonsensical. If a sentence is significant, the grammatical and orthographic defects can always be removed, provided we know what the intended meaning is. We shall therefore use the term 'sentence' henceforth as a synonym for the term 'grammatically correct sentence.' Since a sentence may be grammatically and orthographically correct without being significant, a significant sentence has to satisfy further conditions that are stronger than these two. The necessary condition of significance I propose to examine next is as trivial as these two, but, I think, will not be found acceptable without argument.

The condition I have in mind is one that is imposed whenever we encounter a sentence whose significance we question. If a sentence is significant, we require that it be translatable into the ordinary idiom. The ordinary idiom may be characterized, somewhat vaguely it must be admitted, as the idiom we use in communicating with one another. It is the idiom in which most conversations are conducted and in which almost all books are written. Translatability into this idiom is a necessary condition of significance, because we have but one recourse when we are asked to clarify the meaning of a sentence that is not in this idiom. It would not be to the purpose to answer the question by translating the sentence into another sentence of the same idiom, for its meaning, if it has one, would not thereby become any clearer. The problem can be met only, if at all, by translating the sentence into the ordinary idiom. But since translatability into this idiom is only a necessary condition of significance, there is no guarantee that the result of the translation is a significant sentence. Russell's nonsense sentence "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" is a sentence in the ordinary idiom. The sentence happens to be formulated in English, but it is a simple matter to produce its translation in the ordinary idiom of French or German. Moreover, this sentence can easily be transformed into another sentence in the ordinary idiom of English by replacing "Quadruplicity" and "Procrastination" by their defined equivalents. These translations are of course in every instance as nonsensical as the original sentence.

The objection may now be made that the requirement of translatability into the ordinary idiom is too strong, and that this requirement should be replaced by the weaker condition of translatability into

some other idiom. It is undeniable that often only this weaker condition is imposed when a sentence is put to the test of significance. A metaphysician, for instance, may satisfy himself that the statements of a rival metaphysician are intelligible only if he finds it possible to translate them into his own idiom. However, if a sentence is translatable into the private idiom of a metaphysician, it is also translatable into the public idiom in which communication takes place. Once we grant that a sentence is significant only if it is translatable into some other idiom, we also grant that it is significant only if it is translatable into the ordinary idiom. For if the sentence is found translatable because its meaning is known, then this meaning can also be expressed in the ordinary idiom. The objection is therefore without force. Many commentators on the works of metaphysicians appear to take the view, as a matter of fact, that the stronger condition is a necessary condition of significance. Thus, when McTaggart reaches Hegel's statement that "the Various is the Difference which is merely posited, the Difference which is no Difference," he offers the following translation into the ordinary idiom:

> What is meant by this? I conceive that he means that in this category there is no special connexion of any thing with any other thing. The relation may fairly be said to be one of Indifference, if no thing has any connection with one other except that which it has to all others. And this Indifference, I conceive, arises as follows. We are now dealing with Likenesses and Unlikenesses. But everything is, as we have seen, Unlike every other thing. And it is also Like every other thing, for in any possible group we can, as we have seen, find a common quality. Thus under this category everything has exactly the same relation to everything else. For it is both Like and Unlike everything else.[2]

The works of Hegel have attracted commentators because this philosopher has written thousands of sentences that are not in the ordinary idiom. The commentators attempt to extract the cognitive meaning of these sentences by translating them into a more familiar idiom, though often with results that are satisfactory, as regards intelligibility, only to themselves. Hegel's famous statement "Being and Nothing are one and the same" is undeniably in need of clarification, as Hegel himself admitted. But his own explanation is not in the ordinary idiom, since Hegel uses the terms "the being" and "the nothing" as designative expressions, while the ordinary idiom does not countenance the use of these expressions as designative. It would be unreasonable to conclude, on this ground alone, that the statement is nonsense. But if it is

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[2]McTaggart, A Commentary on Hegel's Logic, p. 112.

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not, its cognitive content can not be appraised until it is translated into the ordinary idiom.

There is a widespread conviction, which is particularly prevalent among logical positivists, that metaphysical statements, such as the one we quoted from Hegel's Logic, are nonsense. In defense of metaphysics it is often said that such statements are intelligible, but that they create the impression that they are unintelligible, because they are expressed in an unfamiliar idiom. Their meaning is revealed only to those who have mastered the idiom. To the uninitiated they appear to be unintelligible, because their meaning is obscure and recondite. If this is the correct explanation of the belief that metaphysical statements are unintelligible, the charge of unintelligibility can easily be disproved by translating these statements into the ordinary idiom. Anyone who has mastered the esoteric idiom and knows what is being said is *ipso facto* in a position to communicate his knowledge in the language he shares with the rest of us. The requirement of translatability is often rejected on the ground that a sentence can not always be translated without loss or change of meaning. Thus it has often been alleged that a work such as Hegel's *Wissenschaft der Logik* is untranslatable. If this allegation means that this work can not be translated literally into French or English without first inventing an esoteric French or English vocabulary, it is unquestionably correct. No one knows how to translate this work literally into the ordinary idiom of these languages, just as no one knows how to translate it literally into the ordinary idiom of the German language. But if the allegation means that one can say things in German that can not be said in another language, it can easily be refuted. For as soon as one has said what can be said only in German, the required translation can at once be produced. The objection therefore has no merit whatsoever. If the proposed translation of a sentence is rejected as inaccurate or incorrect, it is always possible to improve or correct it. A translation that fails to duplicate the meaning of the original sentence can always be corrected as soon as the difference in meaning is known. There is of course a trivial sense in which no sentence is translatable into a sentence either of the same or of a different language. For the causal and particularly the emotive effects of a sentence are different from the effects of its translation, these differences being determined, in part at least, by the differences in the words alone. Translatability of a sentence requires only that its cognitive meaning be reproducible, if it has one; it does not require that its effects on a hearer or reader be reproducible as well.

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One who attempts the solution of the problem of translating a work on metaphysics into the ordinary idiom has to be able to eliminate the technical terms that are used in the work, and, if their definitions have not been given, he has to be able to reconstruct these through an investigation of the sentential contexts in which these terms occur. The technical terms are the terms that are not found in the ordinary vocabulary, and, besides these, all the terms that occur in sentential contexts in which they never occur in the ordinary idiom. He must also be able to replace the terms that are used metaphorically by terms that have literal meaning, for the proposed translation is intended to duplicate only the cognitive meanings of the sentences and not also their emotive or poetic overtones. The problem of translating a work on metaphysics is thus in some respects similar to the problem of deciphering a work that has been written in code. The problem of breaking the code is attacked by taking a part of the work and then replacing the code words by words that have the effect of breaking this part up into intelligible sentences. The correct key has been found if the remaining parts of the work likewise break up into intelligible sentences by using this key. But if the key makes nonsense of the remainder, and this is perhaps the fate of most keys to the secrets of metaphysics, we have nevertheless no guarantee that the correct key has not been found, since translatability is only a necessary condition of significance. The correct key turns sentence into sentence and hence nonsense into nonsense.

That translatability is at least a necessary condition of significance is shown by the fact that we answer a question of the form "What does the sentence S mean?" by producing some sentence we believe to be synonymous with S. If you do not know what a given sentence means you ask someone who does know, and he answers you by translating the sentence into one that has the same meaning. This question is answered in exactly the same way in which a dictionary answers the question "What does the word W mean?" The dictionary specifies the meaning of a given word by means of other words. Hence, if you are ignorant of the meannigs of all words, the dictionary is of no help, and similarly, if you are ignorant of the meanings of all sentences, the meaning of a given sentence can not be explained to you. The procedure we use in explaining the meaning of a sentence suggests that a necessary and sufficient condition of significance is obtained by simply strengthening the requirement of translatability: a sentence is significant if and only if it is translatable into a significant sentence. In one sense of the term "criterion" this condition is of course not a criterion of

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significance. For if a criterion is formulated with the intention of providing us with a method by which we can determine whether or not a given sentence is significant, then the notion of significance can not itself be used in the formulation of such a criterion. A criterion must enable us to make this determination without the prior knowledge that any sentence is significant or meaningless. We shall now turn to the examination of two formulations of the criterion that appear to answer to this description. One of these specifies the necessary and sufficient condition of significance by means of the concept of a proposition: a sentence is significant if and only if it expresses a proposition. The other specifies it by means of the concept of verifiability: a sentence is significant if and only if it is verifiable.

The first of these formulations is based on the view that a significant sentence is related to an entity which is the significance or meaning of the sentence. This entity is the proposition expressed by the sentence. The existence of the entity demanded by this view can of course be guaranteed by defining the phrase "the proposition expressed by S" by means of the phrase "the class of sentences that are synomymous with S." However, the proponents of the view under consideration do not reckon with the possibility of defining the former phrase by means of terms that refer to linguistic entities; they assume, rather, that this phrase designates an extra-linguistic entity. Some philosophers believe that the propositions expressed by sentences are psychical or psychophysical occurrences, others that they are of the nature of Platonic universals and thus non-physical and non-psychical. Now if there are propositions and if sentences express them, and if we can identify the proposition a sentence expresses whenever such a sentence is significant, then we can decide whether or not a given sentence is significant without the prior knowledge that it is significant or meaningless. But if we are forced to make this decision independently of the fact, if it is a fact, that the sentence does or does not express a proposition, it is useless to tell us that all significant sentences and only such sentences express propositions. For this characteristic of significant sentences can not be used to distinguish sense from nonsense, if we do not know how to determine whether a sentence possesses it.

The most recent version of the view that propositions are psychophysical entities is due to Russell. Propositions, according to Russell, are to be defined as "psychological and physiological occurrences of certain sorts—complex images, expectations, etc. Such occurrences are

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expressed by sentences.[3] But nonsense can also cause the occurrence of complex images and expectations, and it therefore becomes necessary to differentiate the kinds of images and expectations that are expressed by significant from the images and expectations that are expressed by meaningless sentences. Russell dismisses this problem with the declaration that "the exact psychological definition of propositions is irrelevant to logic and theory of knowledge."[4] Russell finds it necessary to look for an extra-linguistic entity as the significance of a sentence in the first instance, because he thinks that the syntactical rules of significance are arbitrary unless we can find a reason for them. Apparently he thinks that this reason is to be found in the psychological and physiological occurrences that are expressed by sentences. Now perhaps there is a difference between the psychological and physiological effects that are expressed by significant and by meaningless sentences, but if there is one Russell has certainly not found it. The problem whose solution is to lead him to the discovery of the proposition is formulated by Russell in two ways. (1) "What do we believe when we believe something?" (2) "When a number of people all believe that there is going to be an explosion, what have they in common?" There is only one conceivable kind of answer that can be given to the first question, and that is the kind of answer that is customarily given. Depending on what we take to be the import of the question "What do you believe when you believe there is going to be an explosion?", we give one or the other of the following answers: (1) There is going to be an explosion; (2) I believe there is going to be an explosion; (3) When I believe there is going to be an explosion, I believe there is going to be an explosion. In each case the answer is given by formulating a sentence. To the second question "What is common to a number of people who believe that there is going to be an explosion?", Russell proposes the following answer: "A certain state of tension, which will be discharged when the explosion occurs, but, if their belief was false, will continue for some time, and then give place to surprise."[5] But this answer can not be quite correct. We can not rest satisfied with it because the psychological and physiological states of people who hear about an impending explosion are not the same. Even when the conditions are otherwise the same, people react in different ways to such information. And when the conditions are not the same, the state of tension aroused in a man who knows he is within one hundred yards

[3]Russell, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 237.
[4]*Loc cit.*, p. 237. [5]Inquiry, p. 223.

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of the impending explosion is quite different from the state of tension of a man who knows that the site of the explosion is one hundred miles away. Russell is quite well aware of such differences, but he thinks that they are probably only differences of degree.[6] As a matter of fact, the degree of the state of tension may be so low that the state is undetectable, again by his own admission: "When I believe something less exciting—that tomorrow's 'Times' will contain a weather forecast, or that Caesar crossed the Rubicon—I cannot observe any such occurrences in myself."[7] But if the state of tension may be of such low degree as to be undetectable, this state of tension, i.e., the proposition expressed by a sentence, can not be used for differentiating between sense and nonsense. Every significant sentence may express a proposition, as Russell claims, but this fact does not help us to distinguish significant from nonsensical sentences. The majority of sentences that come before us are too uninteresting and too unexciting; if any of them do express propositions these are too feeble to be observable. Russell's justification of the rules of syntax must hence be considered as a failure. In view of Russell's demand for a justification of these rules, he might have been expected to show that a given sentence is significant by showing that it expresses a proposition. But he never actually uses this procedure. Instead he shows that a sentence is significant by showing that it can be transformed into a significant sentence, i.e., into a sentence that is constructed in accordance with the syntactical rules.

The view that propositions are non-physical and non-psychic entities is the orthodox form of the proposition theory. The chief defect of this theory is that it forces us to hold that propositions belong to a realm of being that is inaccessible to inspection. A sentence does not come before us with the proposition it expresses, if the sentence is significant. Hence how are we going to determine, in the instance of a given sentence, whether or not it expresses a proposition, and, if we decide that it does, how are we going to determine the proposition it expresses? When we are in doubt whether a given sentence is significant, the doubt can not be removed by finding out whether or not it expresses a proposition. The criterion of significance of the proposition theory is formally similar to the criterion we use in determining whether or not a man is married. In the instance of a man, we can remove any doubt regarding his marital status by producing his wife. When we are in

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[6]Cf. Inquiry, p. 225.

[7]Inquiry, p. 224.

doubt whether a sentence is significant, the doubt can not be similarly resolved by producing the proposition it expresses. In order to resolve the doubt concerning a sentence, we are limited to an examination of the sentence and its logical relations to other sentences.

There is a variant of the criterion of significance of the proposition theory that appears to be immune at least to the objection that propositions are removed to an inaccessible realm of being. This variant may be formulated as follows: a sentence is significant if and only if the sentence would designate a fact if the sentence were true. Aside from the fact that this criterion presupposes that we can know, independently of the condition stipulated by the criterion, that a sentence is significant, this being contained in the supposition that the sentence is true, this formulation of the criterion is objectionable on the following additional grounds. The view that sentences are designative expressions and that they designate facts is presumably based on the analogy between proper names and noun-clauses, i.e., clauses in which sentences occur as fragmentary expressions. But this analogy is defective. On the one hand, a proper name can not be eliminated from a sentence without replacing it by an expression, another proper name for instance, that performs the same semantical function. Noun-clauses, on the other hand, are not resistant to elimination. A sentence containing a noun-clause can usually be replaced by a synonymous sentence without replacing this noun-clause by another noun-clause. We have therefore no more reason to suppose that sentences designate facts than that they express propositions. The criterion moreover forces us to distinguish the facts designated by true sentences from the would-be facts designated by false sentences. These would-be facts are indistinguishable from the propositions which the proponents of this theory of significance would like to repudiate. If sentences are designative expressions, then false sentences certainly do not designate facts, if facts, whatever they may be, belong to the accessible realm of being. We can no more provide a false sentence with a fact, than we can provide a spinster with a husband by defining this personage as the man she would have been married to if she had married him.

If propositions were given with the sentences that express them, the criterion of significance of the proposition theory would be an adequate test of significance. But since only one member of this relation is ever given, this criterion must be rejected as inadequate. If the criterion is taken as a definition, it is inadequate, because the defining property can not be used in the identification of sentences as significant

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or meaningless. And if it is taken as a generalization, it is at best an untestable hypothesis. On the proposition theory the decision that a sentence is significant should be based on the antecedent ground that the sentence expresses a proposition. Instead, the doctrine of the proposition theory that certain sentences express propositions is based on the antecedent ground that these sentences are significant.

We come now to the much debated verifiability criterion of logical positivism. This criterion has appeared in innumerable formulations in the last twenty-five years, but we shall limit this examination to the more or less official versions of Schlick and of Carnap. An early formulation of the criterion is given by Schlick in the following terms: "It is impossible to specify the meaning of an assertion otherwise than by describing the state of affairs that must obtain if the assertion is to be true."[8] From this formulation it appears that a sentence is significant if it is translatable into a significant sentence. To take only one example, let us apply Schlick's test to the sentence "Caesar crossed the Rubicon." In the instance of this sentence we can all doubtlessly describe the state of affairs that must have obtained if the sentence is true. Presumably what is here wanted as a description of the state of affairs is not the sentence "Caesar crossed the Rubicon," though this sentence describes the state of affairs in question quite adequately, but rather some other sentence which uses a different set of words but describes the same state of affairs. We may offer the sentence "Caesar went from one bank of the Rubicon to the other" as a description of the state of affairs that must have obtained if and only if Caesar crossed the Rubicon. According to Schlick's own statement, then, the criterion of significance amounts to the assertion that a sentence is significant if it is possible to formulate another sentence which is synonymous with the given sentence. Schlick himself does not say that the second sentence must be significant, but this is of course included in the demand that this sentence be the description of a state of affairs.

Schlick appears to think that the criterion he has formulated is equivalent to the following: A sentence is significant if and only if it is possible to specify for every descriptive word that occurs in it a definitional chain (or a set of such chains) whose last link is an ostensive definition. For he says: "In order to find the meaning of a sentence we have to transform it by the introduction of successive definitions

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[8]Erkenntnis, v. 3, p. 6.

[9]*Loc. cit.*, p. 7.

until finally it contains only words that are not further defined, but whose meanings can be given only by direct ostension."[9] We have observed previously that the condition that is here formulated is only a necessary condition of significance, unless we add the further proviso that the transformed sentence be significant. That the criterion as it stands is only a necessary condition of significance becomes obvious when we consider that Russell's nonsense sentence "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" can easily be transformed into a sentence that contains only ostensively defined terms. But this sentence is not thereby transformed into a significant sentence.

Schlick's second formulation of the criterion may be rendered as follows: A sentence is significant if and only if it is possible to specify the circumstances under which the sentence is true.[10] This formulation is evidently equivalent to the first. For the specification of the circumstances under which a sentence is true is effected by means of sentences. The only circumstance that is at all relevant to the truth of the sentence "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" is the circumstance that Caesar did cross the Rubicon, and the only method known to man of specifying this circumstance is the formulation of a sentence such as the sentence "Caesar crossed the Rubicon" or of some other sentence synonymous with this sentence. There is another version of the foregoing formulation of the criterion in which the notion of verifiability is used. A sentence is significant if and only if it is verifiable, and it is verifiable if it is possible to give a description of the conditions under which it is true as well as of those under which it is false.[11] The property of verifiability that is mentioned in this formulation has nothing to do with verification. To say that a sentence is verifiable is simply a shorthand way of saying that it is possible to give a description of the conditions under which the sentence is true and false respectively.

Schlick's third formulation of the criterion also makes use of the notion of verifiability. But here we get a different account of what is meant by "verifiability." A sentence is significant if and only if it is verifiable, and to say that it is verifiable is to say that it is logically possible to verify it. Schlick says that "a fact or a process is logically possible if it can be *described,* i.e., if the sentence which is supposed to describe it obeys the rules of grammar we have stipulated in our language."[12] If Schlick were now called upon to show that a given sen-

[10] *Loc. cit.,* p. 7.
[11] Schlick, Gesammelte Aufsaetze, p. 340.
[12] *Loc. cit.,* p. 348.

tence is verifiable, we would expect him to show that the procedure of verifying the sentence is logically possible, i.e., that the procedure of verifying the sentence can be described. But this he fails to do. He considers the sentence "Rivers flow uphill," but instead of demonstrating the logical possibility of verifying this sentence, he demonstrates the logical possibility of rivers flowing uphill. It is logically possible that rivers flow uphill, because the sentence is not self-contradictory. Schlick does not say how he determines that a sentence is not self-contradictory. He apparently holds that this determination is made by examining its logical form. However, a sentence that is not self-contradictory in form may nevertheless be nonsensical. Neither the sentence S nor the sentences that describe the procedure of verifying S may have the logical form of a contradiction. But this is no guarantee that these sentences are not nonsense. Schlick's test therefore comes to nothing, because in order to apply it we must know in advance that the sentence S is significant.

Verifiability is a dispositional property of a sentence. The decision that a given sentence is verifiable is based on exactly the same sort of considerations on which one bases the decision that a sample of a given substance has a specified dispositional property. Let us take an example. The label on a bottle identifies its contents as ether and it adds the warning that ether is highly inflammable. This dispositional property is attributed to the sample before us, because of the law that ether is easily set on fire when exposed to an open flame. The law asserts an invariable connection between the defining properties of ether and another property. The dispositional property of inflammability is correctly attributed to the contents of the bottle if (i) the law is correct and (ii) the bottle contains ether. We show that a given senence has the property of verifiability in exactly the same way. We establish (i) a law to the effect that sentences of a specified kind have invariably been verified under specified circumstances and (ii) that the sentence before us is a sentence of this kind. These two conditions are undoubtedly satisfied by sentences of many different kinds. Sentences about last year's arrivals and departures of ships in San Francisco Harbor are verifiable in the sense specified, because we can verify a sentence of this kind whenever we please by looking up the shipping news in a newspaper. Sentences about next week's weather are also verifiable in this sense, because sentences of this kind are invariably verified simply by waiting until next week's weather is here to be scrutinized. Though verifiability in this sense is a sufficient condition of significance, it is

certainly not a necessary condition. If it were a necessary condition, we would have to know that every significant sentence is verifiable. There is no law to the effect that significant sentences have always been verified whenever we chose to ascertain whether one of these sentences is true. The sentence "Caesar was shaved by his barber on the morning of the day he crossed the Rubicon" is significant, but not verifiable. There are a great many sentences about Caesar, but very few of these have ever been verified. Now if the term "verifiability" is understood in the foregoing sense, Schlick's statement[13] that one can not start verifying a sentence until one has established the possibility of its verification, i.e., its verifiability, is exactly parallel to the statement that one can not start burning the ether in the bottle until one has esablished its inflammability. The demand that we first establish that a sentence is verifiable before we start verifying it is as ridiculous as the demand that we first establish that a substance is inflammable before we start burning it. If no one had ever set any substance on fire he would never have learned that some substances are inflammable, and if no one had ever verified a sentence he would never have learned that some sentences are verifiable.

The criterion of significance has so far been formulated by Schlick simply as a test of significance. We must now consider a formulation of the criterion which does not merely specify the conditions a significant sentence must satisfy, but beyond this tells us what the meaning of the sentence is. The formulation reads as follows: "Stating the meaning of a sentence amounts to stating the rules according to which the sentence is to be used, and this is the same as stating the way in which it can be verified. The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification."[14] One wonders whether Schlick, and with him many other logical positivists who have repeated the slogan that the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification, was quite clear in his own mind as to the meaning of the term 'method' when the meaning of a sentence is identified with the method of its verification. A method of verification is a procedure one selects for the purpose of verifying a sentence. Thus I verify the sentence "This is vinegar" by smelling the bottle or by reading the label. But the sentence obviously does not mean smelling the bottle or reading the label. It might be objected that this interpretation of the slogan is a gross misinterpreta-

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[13] *Loc. cit.*, p. 347.

[14] *Loc. cit.*, p. 340.

tion. That this objection is without force becomes quite plain when Schlick takes occasion to refute an opponent who maintains that statements about the future are meaningless under the verifiability criterion on the ground that such statements are not verifiable. In this refutation Schlick is fully conscious of the meaning of the term "method of verification." He repels the attack and wins an easy victory by telling the opponent that statements about the future are verified by waiting for the event to happen and that waiting is a legitimate method of verification.[15] Schlick apparently never noticed that all statements about future events must be synonymous, if we should choose to verify them by waiting, and if the meaning of a statement is identical with the method of its verification.

In so far as Schlick has established a connection between the meaning of a sentence and its verifiability, he uses the term "verifiable" simply as a synonym for "transformable into a significant sentence." If, however, the term "verifiability" is understood in the ordinary sense as the possibility of describing a method by which the truth-value of a sentence may be ascertained, then verifiability is not a test of significance. For a method of testing, i.e., the test sentences, can be formulated only if we know the meaning of the sentence we are going to test. In other words, the decision that the sentence is significant must be made in advance of the testing.

Carnap's formulation of the verifiability criterion is essentially the same as Schlick's, and we shall therefore deal with it rather briefly. Although Carnap has repudiated the criterion in its original form on the ground that sentences are only confirmable and not verifiable, he nevertheless agrees with Schlick that the meaning of a sentence is linked to its verification. The answers to the two questions "What is the meaning of the sentence S?" and "How is the sentence S verified?", he says, are closely connected. Regarding this connection he makes the following guarded statement: "In a certain sense, there is only one answer to the two questions. If we know what it would be for a given sentence to be found true, then we would know what its meaning is. And if for two sentences the conditions under which we would have to take them as true are the same, then they have the same meaning. Thus the meaning of a sentence is in a certain sense identical with the way we determine its truth or falsehood."[16] Let us ask whether what

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[15] *Loc. cit.*, p. 445.

[16] Philosophy of Science, v. 3, p. 420.

Carnap says about the close connection between the answers to the two questions "What is the meaning of the sentence S?" and "How is the sentence S verified?" is true. If someone were to ask me these questions with reference to the sentence "Caesar transivit Rubiconem flumen" my answers would be far from identical. I would answer the first question by translating it into English, and the second by referring my interlocutor to a book on Roman history. It can not have been Carnap's intention to maintain the absurd thesis that the answers one ordinarily gives to these two questions are the same or even closely connected. We must therefore suppose that he had a different type of answer in mind when he wrote that the answers to the two questions are in a certain sense identical. In order to discover the type of answer Carnap requires, let us frame the question about the verification of a sentence in the idiom he proposes: "What would it be for the sentence 'The dog lies under the table' to be found true?" I can think of only one answer: "That would be to find the dog lying under the table." If a sentence is true and if I find it true, I can report to you what I found true only by means of a sentence, either by means of the sentence I found true or a synonymous sentence. Hence, if Carnap means that a sentence is verifiable, and therefore significant if it is possible to specify the conditions under which the sentence is true, his criterion of significance is identical with the criterion of translatability, since the specification of these conditions consists in the formulation of another sentence, synonymous with the given sentence. But if Carnap means that a sentence is significant if and only if it is possible to find evidence which either confirms or refutes the sentence, then the thesis that meaning and verifiability are identical or closely connected must be rejected. For I can not know that something is evidence for or against a sentence unless I know what the sentence means.

Carnap follows Schlick also in producing a variant of the slogan that the meaning of a sentence is the method of its verification. "The meaning of a sentence," he says, "is in a certain sense identical with the way in which we determine its truth or falsehood." Carnap never reveals whether the identity hinges on the sense we give to "way" or whether it hinges on the sense we give to "meaning," or whether perhaps it hinges on some peculiar sense of both of these terms. In any case, if "way" is understood in the same way in which Schlick understands "method" then the slogan is nonsense. But if Carnap means that a sentence is significant if and only if a test method can be formulated by which the sentence can be confirmed or refuted, then the

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slogan is merely false, on the ground that the formulation of such a method presupposes that the meaning of the sentence is known.

We have seen that the logical positivists use the term "verifiable" in both an improper and a proper sense. In the improper sense, a sentence is said to be verifiable when it is possible to transform the sentence into a significant sentence. In the proper sense it is said to be verifiable when it is possible to formulate the observation sentences that would verify the sentence if the sentence were true. But the possibility of formulating these observation sentences presupposes that the decision that the sentence is significant has already been made. You can not devise an observation test until you know the meaning of the sentence you are going to test.

That the question whether a sentence is verifiable can be raised only after the decision that the sentence is significant has already been made becomes especially clear when one examines Ayer's definition of the term "verifiable": the sentence S is verifiable if and only if there is some sentence R and an observation sentence O such that O is deducible from S and R, but is not deducible from S alone nor from R alone. This definition presupposes that the sentences S, R, and O are all significant, for the rules of deduction apply to significant sentences only. If, however, the rules of deduction apply to nonsense also, then every sentence is verifiable and hence significant under the definition Ayer proposes. Ayer has sought to remedy this defect by revising the definition. But the revised form suffers from the same defect as the original: either the sentence that is tested by means of the criterion is known to be significant independently of the criterion or else every sentence is significant.[17]

If a sentence can not be shown to be significant otherwise than by showing that it is convertible into a significant sentence, we may expect this criterion to be used as the test of significance even by those philosophers whose official criterion would indicate a different procedure. This expectation is fully confirmed by an examination of the text. Russell never demonstrates that an apparently nonsensical sentence is significant by finding the proposition the sentence expresses. He always makes this demonstration by showing that the sentence is transformable into a significant sentence. Thus he decides that the sentence "The sound of a trombone is blue" is significant, because this sentence asserts the identity of two objects that have different names. The sentence is

[17]Ayer, *Language, Truth and Logic*, p. 11 sq.

thus merely false, but not nonsensical. Again he shows that the paradox to which the sentence "I am lying" gives rise, on the hypothesis that it is significant, can be avoided, if this sentence is regarded as an infinite conjunction of the sentences "I am asserting a false sentence of the first order," "I am asserting a false sentence of the second order," etc. The resulting translation is again merely false.[18] In one of his examples Russell considers the result of translating the sentence "Quadruplicity drinks procrastination" when the word "Quadruplicity" is replaced by its defined equivalent "That property of a propositional function which consists in being true for exactly four values of the variable," and he wonders how we know that the resulting translation is nonsense.[19] On his own theory it should not be too difficult to remove any doubt on this subject: you investigate the body and find out whether the resulting sentence expresses a proposition. If you fail to detect the complex images and expectations which are the components of propositions, you may be sure that the sentence is nonsense. Russell never avails himself of this procedure. The procedure would indeed be quite useless, even if it were feasible to investigate the body, since nonsense is as prolific in the production of complex images and expectations as the soundest sense.

Carnap holds that a sentence is significant when it is possible to formulate an observation sentence by which the sentence in question can be tested. But he never uses this test when he determines whether or not a sentence is significant. Like Russell he uses the test of translatability. Carnap shows how this test operates in his paper on the repudiation of metaphysics. In this paper he is concerned with showing that a great many of the sentences that occur in Heidegger's *Was ist Metaphysik?* are pseudo-sentences. These sentences are shown to be pseudo-sentences, not by applying the criterion of verifiability, or, as Carnap now prefers, of confirmability, but by showing that these sentences can not be transformed into significant sentences of the ordinary idiom.

In order to see on what grounds the metaphysical sentences of Heidegger are repudiated, it is necessary to translate some of these sentences into English. If we have to do violence to the English language in making these translations, this is unavoidable, since Heidegger had to do violence to the German language when he constructed the

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[18]Inquiry, p. 218.

[19]Inquiry, p. 222.

originals. Heidegger begins by defining the domain of metaphysics. Science, he says, is concerned with the exploration of the real and aside from that with nothing. He then immediately asks the question which is the theme of his paper "How about this nothing?". Since science has preëmpted the realm of the real, there is nothing left for metaphysics but the exploration of the nothing. The question is then followed by sentences of which the following are typical:

> Why are we concerned about this nothing? The nothing is rejected by science and sacrificed as the unreal. Science wants to have nothing to do with the nothing. What is the nothing? Does the nothing exist only because the not, i.e., negation, exists? Or do negation and the not exist only because the nothing exists? We maintain: The nothing is more primitive than the not and negation. We know the nothing. The nothing is the simple negation of the totality of being. Anxiety reveals the nothing. The nothing itself nots.

Carnap shows that none of these sentences can be transformed into significant sentences of the natural language. For in this idiom the word "nothing" is not used as a name. When it appears to be used as a name in a sentence, as for instance in the sentence "Outside there is nothing," the sentence is always transformable into the negation of an existential statement. Everyone of Heidegger's sentences in which "the nothing" is used as a designative expression is accordingly nonsensical, since these sentences are not transformable into sentences of this kind. Furthermore, even if it were assumed that the phrase "the nothing" is used as a descriptive phrase in Heidegger's sentence "The nothing exists," the contextual definition of this phrase would have to be so formulated as to yield the sentence "The nothing does not exist" as a logical consequence. Finally, Carnap points out that Heidegger introduces the meaningless verb "to not." This neologism,—the original is likewise a neologism—, appears in Heidegger's sentences without having been previously defined and can therefore not be eliminated from the sentences in which it occurs. The sentence "The nothing nots" is therefore nonsensical for a two-fold reason. Carnap concludes that Heidegger's sentences can not be constructed in a logically correct language.

A sentence is thus condemned as nonsensical by Carnap not because it is not verifiable, but because it can not be transformed into a significant sentence of the natural language or of a logically correct language which takes the place of the latter. The criterion Carnap actually uses may thus be formulated as follows: A sentence is significant if and only if it is transformable into a significant sentence of standard logical form. A sentence is of standard logical form when it is either

a simple sentence or else constructible from sentences of that kind by truth-functional composition and quantification, and it is moreover significant if and only if the simple components from which the sentence is constructed are themselves significant. The conditions a sentence in standard logical form must satisfy in order to be significant are thus specified in such a way that one can decide in a finite number of steps whether or not the sentence is significant. In other words, when we examine a sentence in standard logical form with the view of determining whether it satisfies the conditions of a significant sentence, we are finally led back to the simple sentences from which the given sentence was constructed. And unless these are significant, the original sentence is not significant.

In the absence of a criterion of significance, either in the sense of a definition or a generalization, we are forced, at the present time, to take significance, with respect to simple sentences, e.g., atomic sentences, as a primitive notion. The decision whether or not a sentence not of this form is significant is made by a recursion procedure. For the simple sentences to which we are led by this procedure we have no test of significance. The criterion of significance for sentences of this form has yet to be discovered.

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Naturalism and Religion[1]

WALTER T. STACE

AT ONE TIME WE USED TO HEAR A GREAT DEAL ABOUT THE CONFLICT between religion and science. But if by science is meant the particular discoveries of particular sciences such as geology, astronomy, biology; and if by religion we mean such essential matters as belief in, and worship of, God, and not, for example, belief in the cosmogony of Genesis; then we may say that the conflict between religion and science is out of date. On the one hand, the enlightened religious man no longer insists that his scriptures contain astronomical or biological truths. On the other hand, the scientist makes no claim to have any knowledge what is inconsistent with belief in God. Though the exact boundary between science and religion is hard to define, it is felt that in some way they have to do with quite different aspects of the world, and that if this is understood, there is no necessity, indeed no possibility, of a collision between them.

There does, however, remain a conflict which religion has to face. It is the much deeper, more dangerous conflict with the philosophy of naturalism which is an outgrowth of the scientific spirit. I will define naturalism as the belief that the world is a single system of things or events every one of which is bound to every other in a network of relations and laws,[2] and that outside this 'natural order' there is nothing. Necessarily therefore naturalism repudiates the existence of any supernatural being or beings, that is, beings falling outside the natural order, and this is the precise point of its conflict with religion.

But we must not misunderstand this statement. According to the definition I just gave, only that is supernatural which lies wholly outside the natural order, that which is not included in the general network of relations and is not subject to the reign of law. On this view many things which are popularly classed as supernatural are not really so. For instance, some people believe that man's soul is non-material, that it survives the body, and may sometimes appear to living people

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[1]Presidential address delivered before the forty-sixth annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association at Clark University, Worcester, Mass., December 27, 28, 29, 1949.

[2]It is immaterial whether the laws are conceived as absolute or statistical. It is said that electrons are in some sense not wholly subject to law. But this does not make them exceptions to the natural order—certainly not supernatural!

as a 'ghost.' Ghosts are certainly popularly regarded as supernatural But naturalism is not the same as materialism. It does not assert that all things are material; nor is dogmatism as to how long any particular entity may last in the world any part of it. A non-material entity, such as the Cartesian *res cogitans,* provided it stands in systematic relations with other things and is subject to the reign of law, is not a supernatural entity. Neither would it become so if it were proved capable of surviving the *res extensa* and being sometimes perceived in this disembodied state. And carrying this line of thought still further we may say that even the God of popular religion, who is conceived as like a human mind, only bigger, better, and more powerful, would not be a supernatural being, since his action and thoughts would presumably be subject to psychological laws of some kind and he would stand in systematic relations with other things and minds. For instance, if he is conceived as a 'first cause,' that puts him squarely in the causal chain of events, and therefore in the natural order.

At this point it may well be asked: if we adopt a definition of the natural order so broad and generous that it includes ghosts and even the God of popular religion, how could any entity conceivably ever be supernatural? How could any religion even assert a supernatural? And how could there be a conflict between naturalism and religion? We shall see, however, that a supernatural being lying utterly outside the natural order, even when it is given this broad definition, is precisely what the religious consciousness does assert. And it is from this that the quarrel with naturalism arises.

II

We may begin with the concept of religious experience. For it is in such an inner experience that religion essentially takes its origin. I dislike this word 'experience' used in this context, because it appears question-begging. To experience something usually means to experience something objective. So if we begin to talk at once about religious experience we seem to be begging the question of the objective existence of the being whom the religious man worships. But I cannot find a better word. And I desire to use it divested of its question-begging implications. I use it, in the first instance at least, for the inner subjective state of consciousness of the religious man. The question whether it implies an objective supernatural being will be discussed later.

Religious experience, at its highest point, is identical with mystical

experience. And since practically all men are capable of religious experience in some degree, it follows that practically all men are capable of mystic experience in some degree. Although we usually class only a very few rare and very exceptional men as 'mystics,' and the rest of us as non-mystics, yet there is in fact no such hard and fast line. It seems likely that the religious consciousness of the ordinary so-called non-mystic is in reality a lower degree of, or a diluted and perhaps impure version of, the mystic consciousness. The relation between the great mystic and the plain man seems to be like the relation between the great poet and the plain man. In both cases the one is creative, the other not. But the plain man responds to the vision of the poet, proving that he too is capable of poetic consciousness. And the plain man, if he is at all sensitive, responds to the utterances of the mystic. They stir within him at least an echo, proving in the same way that he is capable in some degree of mystic consciousness.

The first point that I wish to suggest is that all the theologies and cosmologies of the great religions, Christianity, Islam, Judaism, Hinduism, Buddhism, are ultimately so many alternative intellectual interpretations of mystic experiences which are in all of them basically similar. How far the pure experience of the Buddhist mystic is similar to, or different from, the pure experience of the Christian mystic, is a difficult question to decide. It is not disputed that there are many varieties of mysticism. It is not disputed, on the other side, that in the basic experiences of all, there are deep underlying common characters. In many respects the resemblances between the utterances of Sankara the Hindu and of Meister Eckhart the Christian are extraordinary. But Christian writers such as Rudolph Otto, anxious to stress the unique character of Christianity, tend to attribute the differences of utterance and doctrine to different kinds of mystical experience. Otto, after pointing out the resemblances between Sankara and Eckhart, goes on to discuss the differences. But what he says seems to me to be quite compatible with the hypothesis that most of the differences are in the element of intellectual interpretation rather than in the pure experience interpreted. If so, then the pure experiences of mystics everywhere, in Europe, India, or elsewhere, may well be basically the same. The differences between Hindu mysticism and Christian mysticism may, in that case, be thought of as different interpretations put upon roughly the same mystic experiences by different cultures. For intellectual interpretations may, of course, be culturally determined as well as influenced by the peculiar emotional reactions of different individuals or peoples. For

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instance, Otto makes a point of the dynamic and activist character of Eckhart's mysticism, and of his conception of God, as against the static and quietist character of Sankara's mysticism and of his conception of Brahman.[3] But everyone is aware that European culture in general is activist as against the passivity and resignation of Indian attitudes. And this fact, which is itself probably due in large measure to differences of climate, is much more likely to be the cause of the difference between Sankara's mysticism and that of Eckhart than is some basic difference in the pure mystical experience itself. At least I incline to assume a much greater degree of similarity in basic experiences than Otto, in the interests of Christian uniqueness, would apparently admit.

III

It is commonly said of the mystic experience that, although mystics talk volubly about it, it is nevertheless in some sense *ineffable*. It is of paramount importance to understand in what sense the word 'ineffable' is being used here. It is sometimes said that the content of even sense-experience is ineffable, only its structure being communicable. Whatever this may mean, it is not at all in this sense that mystic experience is said to be ineffable. The precise meaning of the statement that mystic experience is ineffable is that *it is absolutely incapable of being conceptualized*. In this meaning of the word, sense-experience is not ineffable at all. It can be quite easily conceptualized, and in consequence named. We have concepts of, and therefore names for, color experiences, scents, sounds, material things. But mystic experience is claimed to be such that no concepts whatever can be formed of it, and therefore it cannot be expressed in words, either in regard to its content or its structure. Hume spoke of 'impressions' and their corresponding 'ideas.' It is true that by ideas he meant images and not concepts. But if we ignore this irrelevant point and use the word idea to mean concept, then we can say that mystic experience is like an impression to which there corresponds, and can correspond, no idea. It can be experienced, but not thought. It is experiencible, but strictly unthinkable. And this does not mean merely that it is unthinkable to the non-mystic, to you and me. It means that it is unthinkable to the mystic himself, because it is in itself radically incapable of accepting any sort of conceptual framework.

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[3]R. Otto, Mysticism East and West, Part 2, chapter I.

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Whatever we may think of this claim, let us, before commenting on it, take another step forward. Besides being ineffable, the mystic experience is said to be also 'non-rational' and 'supernatural.' And these three words 'ineffable,' 'non-rational,' and 'supernatural,' are commonly used as if they were three distinct terms with different meanings. The point that I now wish to make is that they are all in reality synonymous. To be ineffable is, in the first place, the same as to be non-rational. The word 'reason' and its derivatives are, of course, highly ambiguous. But the non-rational in this context is simply to be defined as what is not capable of being understood by any intellectual concepts. 'Rational' is to be defined as whatever can be so understood. It is sometimes said that the mystic experience is "above reason." This means the same thing, except that to the simple epistemic term 'non-rational' is added an evaluatory term 'above,' which is not at present relevant to our theme. It will be seen that, according to our definition, any sense-experience, such as a color or a sound, is to be classed as rational, because it can be conceptualized, but the mystic experience is not, because no concepts apply to it.

The ineffable is, in the second place, the same as the supernatural. For the natural, defined as whatever lies within the network of relationships and laws which constitute the natural order, can always be conceptualized. For to understand a thing's relations and laws is to have a concept of it. Thus the concept of an electron is contained in its mathematical relations and laws as set out in equations. Therefore what cannot be conceptualized, the ineffable and the non-rational, lies outside nature and is supernatural. This is the answer to the question which we asked at the beginning; how, on our broad definition of 'natural,' which included ghosts and even the God of popular religion, it could ever possibly be claimed that any thing at all is supernatural. We see now the true meaning of supernatural and in what sense it is in fact claimed by religion, namely as that which is so "utterly other" than nature that it cannot be brought within the framework of any rational concepts whatever. And we see why the God of popular theology is not supernatural. For we do quite easily form a rational concept of him. As Hume[4] pointed out, we construct the concept of such a God by 'augmenting' and 'compounding 'such common concepts as mind, good, wise, powerful, etc.

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[4]Hume, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, Section 2.

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IV

The considerations of the previous section throw light upon a well-known difficulty in the history of mysticism. Dean Inge, in his book *Christian Mysticism,* says much of the so-called *via negativa,* especially associated in the West with Dionysius the Areopagite. This consists in the assertion that to the numinous, or God, can be ascribed no positive attributes, predicates or qualities whatever. This is the same as the statement of the previous section that the mystic experience is ineffable because, although it can be experienced, it is incapable of being conceptualized. From this it follows that the divine is to be described only by negatives. It is then emptiness, nothingness, the void, the abyss. The Upanishadic "That Self is to be described by No, No!" is the perfect expression of this tendency, and in Indian philosophy the higher or qualityless Brahman of Sankara is its outcome. Among Christian mystics Tauler speaks of the divine as "the nameless, formless, nothing," "the wild waste," and "the divine darkness," and Eckhart speaks of the Godhead as "the wordless God," "the namless nothing," "the still wilderness." According to Dean Inge this tendency, whether it is found in Indian or Christian mysticism, is to be regarded as an aberration, a gross error, a dangerous heresy, and so forth. True mysticism, he thinks, finds the divine not empty, formless, void, but full of positive content.

But it does not seem to me that an element which is found in at least the vast majority of mystics everywhere can reasonably be regarded as an "aberration" from type. A universal or nearly universal element of a class cannot logically be an aberration from the class-type. And it would not be difficult to show that what the Dean calls a gross error is in fact common to all or nearly all mysticism. Naturally this statement cannot be fully documented here since to do so would require a survey of the entire history of the subject. One may, however, make the following points. The Dean himself asserts that the *via negativa* is a practically universal characteristic of all oriental mysticism. But this is to give away half his case at the outset, to admit that the *via negativa* is found in roughly half the world's mysticism. The Dean gets over this by blandly assuming that non-Christian, and especially Indian, religions are inferior anyhow so that their evidence does not count. But this is not all. Having practically confined the relevant evidence to Christian mysticism, Dean Inge has next to admit that perhaps half the Christian mystics themselves are infected with the same error. He finds it in Dionysius the Areopagite, Erigena, Albertus, Magnus, Bona-

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ventura, Ruysbroek, Suso, and St. Juan of the Cross, and blames them for it. Thus one might say that on his own evidence the "aberration" is characteristic of about three quarters of the world's mystics, namely all those in the oriental half of the world, and half of those in the West. (Of course these percentages are not meant to represent an actual numerical estimate.) But even this is not all. For the truth is that most of those mystics whom the Dean approves—that is to say the remaining quarter—also exhibit the same negative tendency, though it is not in them so much emphasized. This is true, for example, even of the great Eckhart. Eckhart distinguished between God and the Godhead (a distinction parallel to that made by Sankara between the qualitied Brahman and the qualityless Brahman.) God is personal and has the usual divine qualities. But the Godhead is the basic ultimate essence, and is described by Eckhart by the words "the nameless nothing," and other similar expressions already quoted. It is the qualityless, predicateless, empty void. This is the negative doctrine which to the Dean is a gross error. Thus on the question what is the genuine mystic teaching, it seems to me that practically all the evidence is against him.

Nevertheless the Dean is in a sense right. The doctrine of the purely negative divine, equivalent to nothingness, *is* an error, i.e., it is not the genuine doctrine of mysticism, *if it is asserted alone*. But in reality it never is asserted alone even by those Indian mystics whom Dean Inge so much despises. There is always a negative and a positive side, and the *via negativa* is always only an element or moment in the whole mystic message. The divine is on the one hand absolutely without predicates. On the other hand it always has a positive content. This is evident in Eckhart. And it is also quite apparent in the mystics of India. The ineffable being or experience—whether Brahman or Nirvana—is at least conceived as "bliss unspeakable." The Kena Upanishad describes Brahman as "the good in all things." The special lesson of the same Upanishad is that Brahman alone truly possesses 'power.' And so one might go on quoting. This leads to an apparent contradiction. The divine both has and has not qualities. A resolution is sometimes sought by placing the negative and the positive in two distinct existences. Thus we have Sankara's two Brahmans, one with qualities, the other without. The same is true of Eckhart's God and Godhead, though Eckhart is apparently superior to Sankara in that he conceives the process of Godhead into God as necessary, whereas for Sankara the corresponding process seems merely an inexplicable brute fact.

But this method of resolution is not, I think, the genuine mystic

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doctrine. The real explanation seems to be as follows. It is one and the same experience—or God, to use Christian terminology—which is both qualitied and qualityless. How can this be? The assertion that the experience is ineffable, predicateless, to be described by "No, No," means only that no *concepts* apply to it. Nevertheless it *has* positive characters which can be *experienced* although they cannot be conceptualized, that is to say they cannot be caught anywhere within the network of natural relationships. The words used to describe these characters such as 'bliss,' 'blessedness,' 'power,' 'pity,' 'love,' do not really describe them. They are only ideograms, far off metaphors which aim at but do not hit the mark. In this way that being or experience is both qualitied or qualityless. It has the ineffable characters which it has, and yet no predicates apply to it. It can be experienced but cannot be thought. Its positive side is what it is experienced as. Its negative side is that *nothing* can be said of it and as such it is the void.

Of course even this is not a genuine logical resolution of the conflict. For the truth is that a characteristic which cannot be conceptualized is a contradiction. The idea of a supernatural lying wholly outside the natural order, totally unrelated to the rest of experience, is not intelligible. I shall discuss this in the next section. But though we have here no logical resolution, my point is that we have what is, so far as I can see, a correct description of what the mystic means to assert. Whether what the mystic means is ultimately self-contradictory or not, this is at any rate what he means. If he says that the divine is absolutely qualityless, and leaves this negative statement without its positive counterpart, he misunderstands his own meaning. If he asserts both the positive and negative sides of his experience, but places them in two different existences, as Sankara does, he again misunderstands himself. If he asserts both the positive and the negative of one and the same being or experience in the manner suggested in this section, he rightly understands his own meaning. These may seem very bold statements since they appear to be telling the mystic what he means and what he ought to say. But after all this is what Dean Inge does too. And I do not see how it can be avoided by anyone who seeks to *interpret,* i.e. reveal the true inner meaning of mystic utterances, and not merely to repeat and reproduce them undigested and unexplained.

V

Now it may be said at this point that the very notions of the ineffable, non-rational, and supernatural, as I have defined them, are, in

the strictest sense of the word, nonsense, because they are flatly self-contradictory. The very notion of an immediate experience which is wholly incapable of being conceptualized is a contradiction. In the first place one has already conceptualized it when one calls it an 'experience.' For 'experience' is a concept. The same will be true if one uses some other word such as 'feeling' which is also a concept. Moreover various other concepts and words are used to express it. Otto uses the words 'numinous' and 'numen,' and these are undoubtedly concepts. So, for the matter of that, are 'ineffable,' 'non-rational' and 'supernatural.' Otto also draws attention to various similarities between the experience of one mystic, such as Eckhart, and those of another such as Sankara. But to know the resemblances between experience A and experience B is to know something which they have in common, and to know this is to have a concept of them. If mystic experiences were really wholly incapacle of being conceptualized, they could not be compared at all. They could not be called either the same or different.

With this criticism I agree.[5] But it by no means disposes of the matter. For one has now to ask: *why* then do mystics *say* that their experiences are ineffable, non-rational, and supernatural? What causes them to use such language? They are not insane. They are not frauds. They plainly mean something. For it is not plausible to suppose that the words they utter are mere senseless noises like a sneeze or a hiccup. Regarding this problem I offer the following remarks.

First, the experience of which the mystic speaks in this self-contradictory way is an actual fact. It occurs in him.

Secondly, it causes the mystic to display the kind of verbal behavior which he does display, to use the kind of language he does use, just as the sight of a cat causes a normal man to say 'cat.' I am merely asserting a causal relation between the experience and the language.

Thirdly, this causal relation is just like any other causal relation in that wherever the cause occurs the effect will occur. Hence the language which the mystic uses is not random language, nor is it capricious. This means that any man, if he has *that* sort of experience, will inevitably use *that* sort of language, just as if you put a kettle on the fire it will inevitably boil. It means that if you and I had that experience, we should say just the same sort of things as the mystic says, even if

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[5]I think Dean Inge intends the same criticism when he writes: "A revelation absolutely transcending reason is an absurdity. No such revelation could ever be made." (*Christian Mysticism*, page 19.) But it does not follow that this is not the mystic claim, or that it is an aberation from 'true' mysticism.

we knew them to be self-contradictory. This is not merely a speculation. It is supported by conclusive evidence. For mystics do in fact, in all ages, languages, countries, say ***independently*** of one another, the same things about the ineffability, the non-rationality, and the supernatural character of what they experience. This identity of speech cannot be explained by the suggestion that they learn it parrot-wise from one another. Mystics within one culture may possibly learn something of the mystic language from one another. But Eckhart never learned from Sankara, nor Sankara from Eckhart. It is obvious that this sort of self-contradictory language *breaks out spontaneously* from the mystic almost as inevitably as a scream breaks out from a man in intense agony. One man in pain does not have to learn to scream from another man in pain. And neither does one mystic have to learn the mystic language from another, although I do not deny, of course, that one may influence another.

This comparison of mystic language with a scream must not cause my readers to think that I am suggesting some sort of emotive theory of mystic utterances. I should regard any such theory as utterly inadequate. And I am not now discussing whether the mystic experience is more like an emotion or a cognition, or whether it contains something of both, or whether it is something quite different from either. The point of the comparison with the scream is the *spontaneous inevitableness* of the mystic utterance, and has nothing to do with the qualitative character of the inward experience.

Fourthly,it follows from what I have been saying that, although we rightly say in one sense that the mystic's utterance is nonsense, yet there is another sense in which we have to say that *what he says is the correct description of his experience,* and is therefore *not* nonsense. In order to see this let us make what is no doubt a rather fantastic supposal. Suppose that a certain abnormal experience should always cause the words "square circle" to break out spontaneously from anyone who had that experience. This expression would then be understood to be a natural symbol for that experience. Thus however self-contradictory it might be in itself, it would nevertheless be the correct expression of that experience. It would be clearly understood by all those who had had that experience, though it might puzzle those who had not had it and be thought by them to be pure nonsense. Perhaps such phrases as "unconscious mind" or even "unconscious consciousness" are actual examples of something of this sort. For while they may reasonably be said to be self-contradictory, they nevertheless describe facts which

actually occur in our psychic lives. In some such way the language of the mystic is the correct expression of his experience, intelligible as such not only to other mystics, but to us also, the non-mystics, in so far as we have in us at least the rudimentary beginnings of the mystic experience, as I think all religious people, and indeed most sensitive people, do have. This explains how it is that mystic language, in spite of its self-contradictory character, perhaps indeed because of it, does in fact convey meaning, even though it be elusive, to our minds.

VI

The next question to raise is: if it be true, as I have suggested, that the intellectual beliefs, the official dogmas of a religion are interpretations of a basic mystic experience, by what process do these intellectual interpretations arise? How does an allegedly non-rational mystic experience pass over into the conceptual, rational propositions of a creed? This is a very obscure matter, and I certainly cannot hope to give it anything like a complete solution. But the most illuminating suggestion that I have seen is to be found in Otto's theory of the ideogram.[6] He says that the numinous, which is his name for the pure religious experience,[7] is felt as being supernatural and therefore as incapable of being conceptualized. Nevertheless the mystic sees some analogy between a non-natural character of the numinous and some natural quality of things in the ordinary empirical world. He seizes on this analogy and uses the name of the natural quality as a metaphor, analogy, or symbol, for the non-natural quality of the numen. The natural quality is then what Otto calls an ideogram of the non-natural quality. For instance, one aspect of the numinous is that it possesses a character which is perhaps best described as 'awfulness,' in the sense of producing religious awe. Words like 'dread' and 'fear' may also be used, but perhaps 'awe' is the best word. The point however is that not one of these words actually describes the numinous feeling. They are all ordinary natural concepts derived from natural things, which can never therefore actually fit the numinous. Nevertheless there is some analogy, some resemblance, between natural dread or awe and the numinous feeling. Therefore 'dread' and 'awe' are used as metaphors or ideograms of it. Thus arise such expressions as 'the fear of

[6]Rudolph Otto, *The Idea of the Holy*.

[7]Otto does not use 'numinous' as quite synonymous with 'mystical' which I tend to do. But the difference is merely terminological and of no importance for my argument.

God,' the 'wrath of God'; and from thence, when these expressions are taken literally, come such intellectual beliefs as that God can be angry or jealous. To give another instance, the numinous, besides having the character symbolized as awfulness, has also another non-natural character which Otto calls 'fascination.' This attractive character of the numen, which is in contrast to the repellent character of awfulness, is of course indescribable by any natural concept. But the mystic sees an analogy between it and the purely natural qualities of love, graciousness, and so on. Grace and love then become ideograms for the supernatural character which they only metaphorically describe. So also 'power,' 'pity,' 'knowledge,' and presumably even 'mind' are ideograms for characters of the numinous which they do not really describe but only symbolically shadow forth. Thus we get such intellectual propositions as "God is love," "God is a mind, or a person," and so on.

But how do we go on from these simple propositions to the elaborate and abstruse constructions of the theological mind as recorded in official creeds? Otto does not discuss this, and I can only suggest the following obviously very inadequate considerations. In the intellectual interpretation of sense-experience there are various levels. We begin with mere descriptive statements such as "this is red," "this is gold," etc. We pass gradually from the purely sensuous to the more remote and abstract constructions of common sense and science, ending with such constructions as the theory of the electron. Perhaps in the religious sphere something similar can be discerned. We begin with attempted descriptive statements about the numen, such as "God is love," "God is power" which are symbolic or ideogrammatic descriptions of the mystic experience itself. Then by more tenuous threads of interpretation, by elaboration, construction, systematization, we pass ultimately to the abstruse theological doctrines of the creed, which thus correspond to the abstruse physical theories of the scientist. But it must be noted that at no stage of this process, not even in the merely descriptive statements such as "God is love," "God is power," can religious propositions be taken as literal truth. They are in all cases ideogrammatic or symbolic.

VII

Though Otto does not apparently see it, the theory of the ideogram in reality undermines the concept of the supernatural, ineffable, and non-rational which we discussed before. For it supposes an analogy between a natural character such as love or fear and a non-natural

character of the numinous. But an analogy implies a resemblance. And if there is a resemblance between the natural character and the non-natural character, then there is a common element and the possibility of a concept. If the numinous were wholly ineffable and non-rational, then there could not be any resemblance between it and any natural character, and therefore there could not be any ideogram.

This does not, however, make the theory of ideograms worthless. What it does is to show that the mystic experience cannot possibly be as totally ineffable and non-rational as Otto and the mystics would have us believe, which indeed our previous criticism already showed. What it amounts to is that you cannot have one part of experience totally cut off from any relation to the rest of experience. There must be at least some tenuous threads of relation stretching across the gulf. In the end this is the undoing of the whole theory of the supernatural and the justification of naturalism. But what we may probably say is something like this. The mystic experience is so utterly unlike any other experience that the mystic is moved to ascribe to it an absolute, and not merely a relative, uniqueness. And it really is the case that no words and concepts taken from other areas of experience quite fit its characters. Therefore the mystic does seize upon analogies taken from ordinary experience. And if this is so, Otto's theory of the ideogram may be psychologically correct.

We can see how this will necessarily give rise to a symbolic theory of the truth of religious creeds. The creed is not *literally* true, but it is true in a symbolic sense only. The theological doctrine is a myth, which has two meanings. The literal meaning is false, mythical. But the deeper meaning symbolized is true. Thus the question of the truth of a religious creed may be discussed on two levels. First, it may be asserted or denied that it is true in the literal sense. This is the level of popular religious discussion, and it is also the level on which the religious skeptic commonly moves. Secondly, it may be asserted or denied that the doctrines have symbolic truth only. On this view we cannot know the real nature of God by means of any intellectual propositions. He transcends all such conceptualizations. Yet we can get a glimpse of the truth by means of metaphors and myths and symbolic language. The creeds are of this nature. They are not literally true, but they have this kind of symbolic truth. The merit of the theory of the ideogram is that it not only asserts this but gives a psychological explanation of how such symbolization comes about.

It is not at this date possible to defend the literalist view of religion

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against skeptical attack. The reason for this does not lie so much in science, or even in philosophy, as in the demands of the religious consciousness itself. Of course, remaining on the popular level, you can say that there is no evidence of the existence of a vast mind running the universe. Of you can urge all the other common and well known objections. But all this remains jejune and misses the real point. The real objection to the God of popular theology is a religious objection. It is that this being, who is just like a human mind except that he is larger and better, is simply not the God who appears in the numinous experience of the mystic or of the religious man in general. He is therefore not the God whom the religious consciousness demands. The reason is that the religious consciousness at its highest demands the supernatural, in the sense which has been explained, whereas the popular God would be a part of the natural order like a ghost. We have seen that if he is thought as a first cause, this puts him in the chain of causal events. Moreover, since he is conceived as a mind or person, he is necessarily conceived as having ideas and perhaps emotions—since this is the meaning of the word mind—and this implies psychological laws, unless one is prepared to regard the divine mind as wholly capricious. A mind of any sort, however large, good, and powerful, is a natural object, one thing among other things. Moreover the religious consciousness demands that its object be eternal, timeless, and infinite. But no mind can be any of these things. Thoughts and emotions can only be conceived as a stream in time. And such a mind-stream cannot be infinite. For the notion of change which it involves means that an idea or emotion which it has at one time it *lacks* at another. The common phrase "an infinite mind" is thus a contradiction in terms. And if it be said that such a word as mind, when applied to God, is not to be taken in the ordinary human sense of the word, this is to desert the literalist level of interpretation, which we are now discussing, and to admit the point which we are now trying to make, namely that it is not possible to defend the literalist view of religious doctrine.

The common strategy of the religious skeptic consists in taking advantage of the contradictions which thus necessarily break out in the religious consciousness. They break out because the ideogram is forever inadequate to its object. Thus 'mind' is an ideogram for God. But since God is supposed to be infinite and timeless, and no mind can be either, you have a contradiction. The skeptic has an easy time of it pointing out this sort of thing, and on his own ground he cannot be refuted. The ground he chooses is the religious dogma taken literally.

Hence what his argument really shows is only that dogma cannot be defended if taken literally, but only if taken symbolically.

VIII

The creeds and dogmas, then, are myths and symbols. But what is it, we must now ask, that they symbolize? Our argument leads to the conclusion that not only are they symbols, but they have symbolic truth. This follows from what we said earlier about the necessity of admitting that the language of the mystic, however self-contradictory it may be, is correct language for the description of his experience. But if religious language is thus true, what is it true *of*? What is the subject matter of its symbolic ascriptions? The only possible answer is that, in the first instance at least, what the symbols refer to is the inner subjective experience of the mystic. It is possible to make the further claim, as the Christian religious man always does, that this inner subjective experience is itself identical with an objective outer supernatural reality. And this claim must be considered. The point, however, is that it is a ***further claim***. For I do not see how the religious man himself can deny that what in the first instance leads him to his affirmations is an inner experience, the mystical experience present in his consciousness, the numinous feeling, or however it is described. The point is that there are two quite distinct and separate questions involved here. The first is the relation of the symbol to the inner experience; the second is the alleged relation of the inner experience to an outer objective reality. And it is as regards the first of these questions that the conclusions so far reached hold true. The language of the religious man and the mystic arises out of his inner experience. The claim that this language is literally true even of this inner experience cannot be maintained. The claim that it is symbolically true of the inner experience can. Thus the symbols do not in the first instance symbolize an objective being, but the inner experience. Thus when the mystic uses such words as 'power,' 'love,' 'awesomeness,' 'dread,' these are ideograms or symbols which have symbolic truth, but what they are symbolically true of is the numinous experience within his own consciousness.

IX

But we have now to face the final and crucial question of the claim to objectivity. There are two possible versions of this claim. First, it may be alleged that the inner experience *implies* an objective super-

natural. This makes the inner experience one thing and the implied objective supernatural being another. They are numerically two distinct things of which one implies the other. This would be a kind of representative theory of religious knowledge. There is no doubt that this is not in keeping with the feeling of the mystic. The second alternative would be a kind of presentative view, according to which the inner experience is actually identical wtih the objective supernatural being. That the religious man would prefer this is implied in his constant refrain that in his experience the distinction between subject and object is transcended, and in his claim that he is in immediate contact with the divine without any intervening screen of representation.

Our question then is: Admitting that the language of the mystic and the religious man generally, including the more elaborate constructions of the official creeds, is symbolically true of the inner religious experience, can we admit the further claim that this inner supernatural is identical with an outward objective supernatural being?

The conclusion to which I have come on this matter is that when words like "objectivity," "object," "existence" and "reality" are applied by the religious man to what he venerates, these concepts, just like 'power,' 'love,' 'pity,' 'dreadfulness,' can only be regarded as ideograms of his experience. This means that they are only symbolically, not literally, true. This means that just as there is something in the numinous experience which impels the mystic to use such words as power and love, although these natural concepts are not, and cannot be, literally true of, or adequate to, the actual internal supernatural which he is seeking to describe; so also there is something in the numinous experience which impels him to ascribe the natural characters of existence, objectivity, and reality to it in the same purely symbolic way. To put it in another way, to call God an object, or objective, or real, or even existent, is itself symbolic language which is not literally true. It belongs to the level of popular religion in just the same way, and for just the same reasons, as the ascription to God of a stream of conscious emotions and ideas.

It may be said that in the last analysis this is to deny the dearest claim of the religious man and to put forward a purely subjective theory of religion.[8] I shall try to show that it is not true that our con-

[8]'Objective' and 'subjective' have several, perhaps many, meanings. I have no room for precise analysis. All I can do here is to say that I believe I am using the words in the sense in which it might be said that a man's *fear* of a tiger is subjective, but the *tiger* objective.

clusion necessarily conflicts with the deep intuitions of the religious consciousness. But what I wish for the moment to emphasize is that our conclusion is not reached by bringing to bear upon religion arguments drawn from some source external to itself, such as physical science, or psychology, or even philosophy. On the contrary, I say that this conclusion arises internally from the utterances and assertions of the religious consciousness itself. I shall use no external arguments to support it. I shall show that it proceeds from the theory of religion itself.

There are three such internal considerations which render it necessary. In the first place, it follows directly from the theory of the ideogram, which is itself a direct interpretation of the religious experience. For the theory of the ideogram asserts that no natural or rational concept whatever can be applied to the numen except symbolically. Now the concepts 'objective,' 'real,' 'existent,' are just as much ordinary, natural, empirical concepts as are 'love,' 'pity,' 'power' or, for the matter of that, as 'table' or 'horse.' Therefore they cannot be applied literally, but only symbolically, to the numen. It is not possible to be half literalist, half symbolist, to pick and choose among natural empirical concepts, saying that some are to be taken literally, others symbolically. You cannot have it that 'power' and 'love' are only symbolic, but that 'objectivity' is literal. The theory of the ineffableness and non-rationality of the numen implies this. For the very meaning of it is that the numen is utterly incapable of *any* conceptualization. Therefore it is incapable of accepting the concepts 'objective,' 'real,' 'existent' and so on. Otto would, perhaps, try to reject this conclusion. But it follows inevitably from his own view.

In the second place, our conclusion is implied by the language of the mystic himself. It might be said that Otto's theory of the ideogram is after all only Otto's theory, which the religious man is not bound to accept. But this cannot be said of the utterances of the mystic himself. Now one of his most famous expressions—and this is true of all mysticism everywhere, in the East as much as in the West—is that in his experience the distinction between subject and object is transcended. This implies at once that his supernatural is not an object. If it be replied that although God is not an object (which some mystics would admit) yet he is objective, one must say that such a distinction is unintelligible. It says that the adjective can be applied but not the corresponding noun; as if one were to say that a shape is circular but not a circle. It is true that the claim of transcending the distinction

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between subject and object, as well as implying that God is not objective, seems equally to imply that he is not subjective. But it cannot be denied that the numinous feeling, to which, as I have shown, all ideograms must in the first instance apply, is within the consciousness of the mystic and that it is in that sense subjective. To deny this would be to say that the mystic cannot really experience it at all.

In the third place, our conclusion is also implied by the nonrationality of the experience. Any intellectual creed, any proposition about God, even "God exists" is an attempt to translate the nonrational into the rational, to bring it within the network of rational concepts. This is perfectly legitimate in the sense that the mystic naturally and inevitably seeks to do it, because he is after all a rational being, and because he cannot speak at all of his experience or seek to communicate it to others unless he does use rational concepts. But on his own showing, any rational proposition whatever which he frames about the divine, even "God exists," must be only a symbolic, and not a literal, truth.

X

There are three things which remain to be discussed. (1) We must show that this conclusion in no way destroys the value of religion or of the religious experience. (2) We must show *why* many religious men and mystics claim for their experience a kind of objectivity which cannot be admitted, and why they feel a strong, perhaps almost violent, impulsion to reject such a view as ours. (3) We must show that, although our view may be thus distasteful to some religious men, and may seem to them to do violence to their intuitions, yet this is by no means universally true as is commonly supposed. For there are religions which, according to the view I am expressing, arise out of a mystic experience fundamentally similar to that of the Christian, if not identically the same, but yet interpret that experience precisely in the subjectivistic and naturalistic way I am suggesting. I refer to Hinayana Buddhism and the system of Yoga. If this is the case, then the common assertion that the religious consciousness universally rejects the subjectivist view is untrue, and is to be regarded as a mere provincialism of the western or Christian man.

XI

I begin with the question of religious value. I should claim three things here; first, that the value of the religious experience is intrinsic,

and not merely instrumental; second, that it is *sui generis,* and cannot be reduced to moral or any other value; third, that it is the supreme value of human life, transcending all other values, precisely as the religious man claims.

As to the first point, religion has of course its instrumental value in that it leads to an enhancement of common moral values. It is a commonplace that the mystic, his life transformed by his experience, sets himself to serve humanity and becomes a centre radiating moral endeavor and moral values. But religious value itself is utterly distinct from, and superior to, mere moral value, and resides intrinsically in the numinous experience itself. There is nothing at all peculiar in this claim. It is in line with the nature of all intrinsic value everywhere. For it is the common character of all intrinsic values that their *locus* is an immediate experience of some kind wherein they are directly apprehended. This is true even of common bodily pleasures and pains. Eating good food just has in itself the intrinsic value of pleasantness, and a toothache just has in itself the intrinsic disvalue of unpleasantness. The same is true of the higher value of beauty. A certain red, or a certain color or tone combination, just is immediately felt as aesthetically satisfying. And all questions of subjectivity or objectivity are irrelevant here. It may be a legitimate dispute whether there is some sense in which color is subjective. But whether it is or not, *that* red, *that* color combination, has exactly the same beauty. It may be a legitimate dispute whether beauty itself is subjective or objective in some sense or other, but this is irrelevant to the question whether a particular poem or picture is beautiful. Just so its own peculiar value is intrinsic to religious experience whether we consider that experience subjective or objective. Therefore a subjective theory of it does not rob it of its value.

The next point is that religious value is *sui generis,* and cannot be reduced to moral or aesthetic values. Here again there is nothing peculiar in this claim. Why should one value be reduced to another? Not all bodily pains are toothaches, and not all bodily pleasures are pleasant tastes. That religious value is *sui generis* simply means that it is directly experienced as having its own special character, which is not the same as the character of moral value. The reduction of religion to mere ethics, the supposition that we can extract the gold of its ethics and discard the rest of it as dross is felt at once to be a shallow interpretation, a veritable castration of religion. The reason is that in such a process we throw away the especial value peculiar and intrinsic to

religious experience, and can never find it again in the residue of moral value left over.

The final point regarding religious value is that it is the supreme value of human life transcending all others. What the religious naturalist requires here is a doctrine of emergent values. There is a hierarchy of values. At the bottom of the scale are bodily pleasures. Above them come moral, aesthetic, and intellectual values. At the apex is the value of the mystic experience. It is no doubt an important problem what we mean by 'higher' and 'lower,' and how such a scale can be rationally articulated and justified. We know something of the difficulties of analysis here from our studies of Bentham and Mill. But it is not my purpose to discuss that thorny question. It is sufficient for my purposes here to say that by 'higher' or 'lower' I mean simply what are intuitively felt to be such by those who experience the values concerned without regard to any question of the logical justification of the intuitions.

We may say then that intrinsic values emerge in the organism in an hierarchial order, and that religious value is the highest of these emergents. Values, including religious value, grow naturally out of the soil of the world. And the old question of "where they come from," the old assertions that "the higher cannot come out of the lower," can be shown very easily to be logically without any merit, although I have no time for that undertaking here.

XII

The next question is: why is the religious man, at any rate in the West, so apt to be insistent upon a kind of objectivity which cannot be granted to him? Obviously this must be due to some character of the numinous experience itself which the mystic feels compelled to symbolize by the ideograms 'objectivity,' 'reality,' and 'existence.' The problem is to identify this character or characters. There are, I believe, two such characters. They are the ***intensity*** of the experience, and its ***value-quality***.

The intensity is probably the less important. But this intensity, vividness, or force of the experience is sometimes compared by mystics themselves to that of a blinding flash of lightning. It does not require much imagination to understand how a man might feel impelled to say that such a lightning flash is more real to him than the flicker of a candle-flame. Real here certainly does not mean objectively existent; it simply means more intense. However, I do not feel that this suggestion

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goes anywhere near the bottom of the matter, though I believe it has a certain value.

What seems to me really decisive is the value aspect of the experience. It is felt, as we have seen, to be of supreme value. Now there seems to be an almost ineradicable tendency in the human mind to confuse value-categories with existence-categories, to transform the axiological into the ontological, to suppose that what is more valuable is also more real. One finds this in Plato, Spinoza ,and in all the great idealistic systems of philosophy. This amounts to an equation, value= reality=objective existence. There is no question that this is also a marked characteristic of the mystic consciousness. To give only one example. The space-time world is dismissed by some schools of Hinduism as illusion. This cannot really mean that the space-time world does not exist, though the mystic himself comes in the end to think that this is exactly what it does mean. The dismissal of the world as illusion is in essence a judgment of value. The world is rejected as worthless trash when compared with the transcendent value of the mystic experience. But in accordance with the equation given above, this value judgment becomes transformed into a judgment of the non-existence, or at least the "mere appearance" character, of the world.

The ideal (not the historical) development of the belief that the world is unreal, or half-real, or illusory, or mere appearance seems to have three stages. (1) An axiological judgment of the worthlessness of the world is made. In general the sorrows of the world, and especially its disappointments and disillusionments are the ground of this judgment. (Note that the word 'disillusionment' contains already a sort of leap from the axiological to the ontological. For it is in essence a value word, but yet it suggests the ontological idea of illusion. It means the discovery that a supposed value is an illusion or is non-existent.) Another essential ground of the value judgment is the *fleetingness* of things. The flux is the principle of the destruction of all things, but especially of values. Beauty and goodness and life itself pass away in the flux which is therefore the root of all disillusionment. Hence we find that it is especially the flux which causes Plato to condemn the world of sense as only half-real.

(2) The axiological judgment is transformed into an ontological judgment in accordance with the erroneous equation value=reality= existence. "The world is worthless" becomes "the world is unreal."

(3) In the final stage *arguments* such as the paradoxes of Zeno or the antinomies of Kant are brought forward to *prove* the ontological

unreality of the world. All such arguments are therefore in their nature afterthoughts or rationalizations.

These considerations show us why the mystic, because of the valuelessness of the world, comes to regard it as ontologically unreal. In order to see why he insists that his inner mystical experience is an objective supernatural, and why he rejects the theory that it is subjective, we have only to see that the converse also holds. Because of the transcendent value of the experience he declares that it is real, or has objective being.

XIII

This brings me to my third and last point. I say that mystics do not necessarily object to a naturalistic and subjectivistic interpretation of the mystic experience; that there are world-religions which actually interpret it in precisely that way; and that therefore the common assertion that an objectivist interpretation is absolutely bound up with the religious consciousness and cannot be rejected without doing violence to that consciousness, is nothing but a western or Christian provincialism, not essential to religion, and no necessary part of the universal religious spirit of man.

Both Hinayana Buddhism and the system of Yoga are atheistic. They do not deny the mystic experience. They rest entirely on it and are interpretations of it alternative to Christianity. But they do not interpret it theistically, which is the same as saying that they do not project the numen out of the mystic's mind into the objective world as an objective entity.

Consider the Buddhist conception of Nirvana. This is genuinely mystical and numinous. Toynbee classifies Hinayana Buddhism as merely a philosophy, denying it the name religion on the ground that it is atheistic. But Otto, much more profoundly, insists that it is a religion because its inner experience is numinous. Toynbee's assertion is the fruit of the western and Christian provincialism of which I spoke above, and though Otto presumably has the same prejudice, he does not allow it to blind him to the truth in this matter.

Nirvana is quite definitely a subjective state of mind, not a thing or a place, and therefore not objective. Consequently it can be attained by a man while he is still alive in the body, and was so attained by the Buddha himself. But on the other hand while Nirvana is thus quite naturalistically and subjectivistically conceived, it quite as clearly has the characters of being ineffable, non-rational, and supernatural which

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are found in all mystic experience. Max Muller says: "The final goal of the Yoga or of the Samkhya, nay even of the Vedanta, and Buddhism, always defies description. Nirvana . . . is a name and a thought, but nothing can be predicated of it. It is what no eye hath seen, and what hath not entered into the mind of man. We know *that* it is, but no one can say *what* it is.[9]

The non-rationality of Nirvana is the source of the mis-statement that it is simply annihilation, an absolute blank nothingness. It certainly is the cessation of all other and lower forms of consciousness and experience. Hence no ordinary empirical concept applies to it. It is therefore in a sense a total empirical vacuum. This is the source of the idea that it is annihilation. But the Buddhist declares that it is full of positive content. It is supreme bliss. The solution of this puzzle, that it is both something and nothing, is that the mystic experience of Nirvana has the same characters of ineffability and non-rationality as the Christian numinous. As in the case of the Christian numinous it can be experienced (that is its positive content), but it cannot be thought or conceptualized (which is the point of view from which it is said to be nothing). This is to be compared to the frequent assertions of Christian mystics that God is the Void, emptiness, the Abyss. "Godhead" says Eckhart "is as void as if it were not."[10]

The Buddhist Nirvana is to be compared in these respects to the Hindu Brahman. The Brihadaranayaka Upanishad says: "That Self (Brahman=Atman) is to be described by No, No! He is incomprehensible for he cannot be comprehended."[11]

No predicate whatever can be applied to Brahman. And one asks, as in the case of Nirvana, how then can Brahman be anything? The answer is that the assertion that no predicates apply to Brahman is identical with the ordinary mystic assertion that the numen is non-rational because no concept can apply to it. All this is true alike of Nirvana, Brahman, and the experience of western mystics such as Eckhart.[12]

[9] I should want to amend Max Muller's statement that "Nirvana is a name and a thought." It is not a thought, or concept. It is unthinkable, but it is an experience. But in general Max Muller's statement is acceptable regarding the mystical and ineffable nature of Nirvana.

[10] Quoted Otto, *Mysticism East and West*, page 183.

[11] *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad*, Fourth Adhyaya, Fifth Brahmana.

[12] Hinduism objectifies the mystic experience as Brahman and then again proceeds to identify the objective Brahman with the subjective mystic experience in the formula Brahman=Atman. Buddhism simply leaves out the first step, and does not objectify the mystic experience at all. It is then Nirvana.

Of course we can explain the differences between objectivist Christianity and subjectivist Buddhism by saying that the mystic experiences at their bases, in spite of their common characters of being ineffable, non-rational, and supernatural, are otherwise quite different. We may suggest that perhaps the Buddhist numinous lacks that element of the Christian numinous which causes the Christian to objectify his experience. This will no doubt be the line taken by those who wish to emphasize the unique character of Christianity. But this does not seem to me to be at all a likely explanation. For if it is true, as I have suggested, that it is the *value* experience in the numinous which causes the claim to objectivity, then it must be pointed out that this value element is certainly not lacking in the Buddhist's experience which he claims, exactly as does the Christian, to be "bliss unspeakable." Moreover there is positive evidence that the objectivity-element is not lacking in Indian mysticism generally, since the Hindu does objectify his numen as Brahman. It is surely highly unlikely that the Buddhist numinous is the same as the Hindu numinous with, so to speak, the objectivity element left out.

It is a much more likely hypothesis that the difference between the objectivism of Christianity and the subjectivism of the Buddhist creed lies in the element of interpretation rather than in the basic experiences of the two religions. And this may well be because the Buddha was too analytically clear-headed to make the common confusion between value and obpective reality. This is not a mere *ad hoc* suggestion. It is supported by the whole character of Buddhist thought. It harmonizes with the curiously Hume-like empiricism, skepticism, and even atomism, which characterized the Buddha, and made him into what he was, a religious naturalist. Moreover there is positive support for my suggestion in the fact that the Buddha—as portrayed in the Hinayana texts—did not dismiss the world as an illusion as did the Hindu philosophers. He is, on the contrary, a naïve realist as regards the external world. This shows that he did not accept the equation, value=existence, and was not subject to the common confusion of axiological with ontological categories. For he, perhaps even more strenuously than the Hindu philosophers, insisted on the worthlessness of the world. But he does not on that account consider it ontologically unreal. Likewise he was as aware as any mystic of the supreme value the mystic experience (which he called Nirvana), but he did not on that account transform it into an objective entity.

The aim of these considerations concerning Buddhism has been to

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show that the common assertion that the mystic experience absolutely demands an objectivist interpretation, that the subjectivist view must necessarily be rejected by a religious man as shallow and as doing violence to his deepest intuitions, is simply not borne out by the evidence; that a subjectivist and naturalistic interpretation is perfectly compatible with the religious experience itself and with a deeply religious life.

I might go on to make entirely parallel statments about the system of Yoga. It also is deeply mystical and religious. But it too is atheistic and treats the mystic experiences as nothing more than an inner experience of the soul, that is to say, as subjective. But from considerations of space, I refrain from elaborating these remarks.

If all these things are so, then it will be seen that there is no necessary hostility between naturalism and religion; that the conflict between them is capable of reconciliation. This paper is an attempted contribution to such a reconciliation. What I have tried to show is that it is not necessary for the naturalist to be anti-religious, or even merely non-religious. He can be as deeply religious as anyone else. Nor is it necessary for the religious man to reject naturalism.

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Truth and Falsehood, Mostly Falsehood[1]

ALBERT E. AVEY

"OF ALL THE GOODS, FOR GODS AND MEN ALIKE, TRUTH STANDS FIRST. Therefore let every man partake from his earliest days, if he purposes to become blessed and happy, that so he may live his life as a true man so long as possible. He is a trusty man; but untrustworthy is the man who loves the voluntary lie; and senseless is the man who loves the involuntary lie; and neither of these two is to be envied."[2]

I

Truth and falsehood are concepts about as frequently used as any in our repertory of thought. Their significance, and contrast, are taken for granted ordinarily, as if they were unquestionably valid. Yet, as in many other features of common experience, they involve problems which are not easily analyzed, nor even adequately stated without difficulty. Furthermore, there are direct implications which are crucial for the epistemology and metaphysics which we find it possible to hold. (One needs only to recall Professor Morris's discussions of theories of mind a few years ago, and comments on the topic by Professors Hocking and Lovejoy, to see how the problem of error was the rock on which various theories are shipwrecked.) Many important implications are connected with our conception of truth; but even more significant consequences follow from our conception of falsehood.

The pathways to reality are many, and every one is important: for reality is our prime concern. What I am proposing now is that we approach the realm of reality by way of the consideration of the nature of falsehood and the place it occupies in the structure of the real. In Kantian phraseology our question is: How is error possible? What structure must a universe have in order to allow the occurrence of error?

In the history of thought there have been many discussions of the nature and conditions of truth. There has not been sufficient direct consideration of error. Examine a score of recent treatises on Theory

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[1]Presidential address delivered before the forty-eighth annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., May 4, 5, 6, 1950.

[2]Plato Laws V, 730 c., Loeb trans.

of Knowledge and see what scant attention is given to error's explanation. I invite you therefore to join me for a while (all too short to do more than suggest some considerations of importance) in meditating upon this crucial topic.

II

As for the distinction between the terms "falsehood" and "error," let us note in passing that the first (falsehood) is commonly characterized as a property of propositions, the second (error) as non-veridical apprehension. The latter though not false in itself, fosters errors and leads to false judgments. I am concerned here with those occurrences in experience in which apprehensions are not integrated directly into the structure of reality, and can not be formulated into propositions that would be called 'true.'

Truth is the most important of all our values; and every proposition has a truth claim.

But the elusive character of a definition of truth and error is indicated by the variety of the attempts that have been made to formulate such definitions.

Aside from those instances, as in some of the utterances of Augustine, where 'truth' and 'existence' are identified, an essential feature involved in the definitions is that truth and falsehood imply a reference of some phase of experience to something beyond itself.

(a) Sometimes this has meant the reference of an image, whether of memory or of anticipation, to a direct percept; as when we say: The building has eleven stories, but upon direct inspection it is perceived to have ten. Or when we say: The sun will shine tomorrow, and actually the weather proves to be cloudy and dark throughout the day.

(b) Sometimes it has meant the relation of a percept to a concept; as when we say: It is an insect, when actually it is an arachnid.

(c) Again, it refers to the use of a set of linguistic symbols in accordance with accepted rules; as in the case of the assertion: He uses correct, or incorrect, English.

(d) In still other cases it refers to a transcendent realm beyond consciousness: as when scientists, like Jeans or Eddington, and philosophers, like Kant or Cassirer, raise the question how far human experience correctly represents, say, cosmic history as it was before any human being existed, or how far human experience at any time distorts the realm of things-in-themselves.

The problems which arise in connection with the discussion of truth

and error swing to an emphasis one way or another according as they involve one or another of these types of relation. But the most subtle and therefore the most interesting is the last, the case in which the question of transcendence of human experience is raised. At this point the problem boils down to the question: Is there any way in which it is possible directly or indirectly for human experience to furnish knowledge of that which is beyond it? Can we determine whether in any instance the alleged knowledge is true or false? And what indications can we find here as to the structure of knowledge and reality?

The discussion of the question will involve the problem of truth and falsehood in the first three senses listed; but these points can be sufficiently determined while yet there may remain untouched the crucial question, viz. the last meaning,—concerning the relation of human experience to a reality beyond it.

Even in the discussion of the concepts in the last sense mentioned there are a number of different theories to be reckoned with:

(a) There is for example the position of naïve realism to the effect that error is failure to grasp existing facts as they are. This definition assumes that sometimes the mental content of experience and the existent real are identical, but that while this is sometimes true it is not always so.

(b) The condition under which the mental image is called erroneous has at times been held to be: that it does not repeat the qualities and characteristics of the reality referred to. The image does not copy the real.

(c) But a copy theory runs into so many difficulties that it is not long before it gives way to a theory of correspondence or representation in which the mental image need not *repeat* the characteristics of its intended object but merely *represent* them in a way which accords with a prescribed definition of what shall constitute representation or correspondence. The process described by Professor R. W. Sellars some time back in his discussion of Critical Realism is relevant here. It is the "Advance of the Personal," which gradually withdraws the subject farther from the object and sets a gulf between them which intensifies the problem of how knowledge is possible, and how one can know whether one's ideas correspond to reality or not.

(d) Carried to the extreme this theory of subjective representation has ended in skepticism regarding an objective world, and solipsism as the final position.

(e) Conceding that there is no way for consciousness to transcend

itself the coherence theory reduces the nature of truth to a mutual support of aspects of experience, and holds that if this coherence is not merely a relation between concepts, but also includes the exemplification of concepts in individual instances, or the failure to do so, it then covers all that truth and falsehood ever mean.

(f) This concession to subjectivism still leaves unsolved the problem of why anyone ever believed in an objective realm at all. A glance through the history of ideas will show how repeatedly at this point theory has resorted to the consideration of action, making the answer essentially pragmatic.

(g) But there are two kinds of Pragmatism, relative and absolute. Most pragmatists have overlooked a crucial sentence in Wm. James's definition of truth and goodness from the pragmatic point of view, in the famous statement: "The true, to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way of our thinking, just as the right is only the expedient in the way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient in the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all farther experiences equally satisfactorily."[3] Readily seeing difficulties in and objections to his definition of truth and goodness in terms of expediency James added the phrase: "in the long run and on the whole of course." Royce took him up on the question of the length of the run and the size of the totality; and finding no limit to either saw them aiming at the infinite. There resulted Royce's Absolute Pragmatism, a form of pragmatism which avowed pragmatists have been unwilling to espouse.

At this point it may be noted that error is not merely finitude, incompleteness in our mental grasp. If this were the situation then only an Infinite, Omniscient mind would have any truth. But if as a consequence no truth whatever could be attributed to finite thought, then we should be compelled to say that there is no truth whatever in the utterances we are now making or in any other utterance that any finite being could make. Even our admissions of modesty and of partial falsehood would be false. All discourse would become impossible.

III

The question of the nature of falsehood is of crucial importance because in some systems of epistemology and metaphysics falsehood is impossible.

[3] *Pragmatism*, p. 222.

The first point to be established then is the actual occurrence of error. Difficulties in the way of understanding how it can be possible led the Sophists of Greece, basing their argument upon the suggestion of Parmenides that men always hold to the objects of their thinking as in some sense realities, to assert that no one ever can think of what is not, and if what one is thinking of is always real then thought always apprehends reality, and must always be true. Protagoras's 'man measure' doctrine was one formulation of this conviction. Plato, in his *Euthydemus* and *Sophist* gave consideration to this view; and Augustine, Anselm and Thomas also reckoned with it.

In recent thought one meets with the assertion that in the light of the reign of law no error is possible. In the case of mechanistic or other completely deterministic metaphysics presenting a tightly integrated system, how would it be possible for error to occur? For what mechanism always gives is a close-knit structure. Every part, every detail meshes exactly with every other detail. Nature never makes a mistake. The laws of physics never forget to work; nor do they work incorrectly. Biological, psychological and social behavior are regarded as special manifestations of the physical. The result is complete determinism or fatalism.

But error is, as the word itself means,—a wandering. And how in such a completely mechanically determined world any "wandering" could occur on the part of any detailed segment, even a mind, it is impossible to see. No component part of a mechanism ever refers beyond itself. It merely exists, and operates in contact with the parts next to it. But actual experience does show such wandering for there are those who are unconvinced by the above-mentioned theories.

For complete determinism even normal perception presents a basic problem because the content of a percept is not a report of the physical and chemical processes occurring in the cortical cells functioning in the perception but a report of something beyond these. Perception is creative. The difficulty of explaining the processes of illusion and hallucination is even greater since these are reports of what is not in the objective world. How reality interacting with reality can produce an impression of unreality is incomprehensible. And when it comes to the recollection of a past event or anticipation of a future, where in the nature of the cases the objects do not exist mechanistic explanation becomes completely hopeless.

It is not possible to dismiss the problem simply by asserting that some minds are destined to be in error, or that human consciousness in

general is fated to distort objective reality. For our demand is for a statement of just what such an assertion means; we want to understand 'the particular go' of the situation. If mind is endowed with a capacity to distort, it must be possessed of a freedom of activity which escapes complete mechanism in the universe.

Absolute Idealism from Fichte on presents many of the same difficulties as does Materialism. If we accept an extreme monism of this type we again face the problem of freedom, and without some degree of freedom error is just as impossible here as in physical mechanism. If the finite is involved in the infinite by logical implication as well as mechanical necessity falsehood seems eliminated. This of course has been a stock criticism of Royce's Absolute from the time Wm. James called it a 'block universe.'

Nor will Pluralistic Idealism, unqualified, meet the situation; because, though it allows enough freedom to make error intelligible, it still leaves unclear the questions:

1. Why is it that one finite being is so tied in with others that no individual appears in this world who did not come as the offspring of other individuals?

2. If each individual is wholly independent of an objective world, how does any one ever know whether his impressions of reality are correct or not?

The parallelism of Spinoza, Stout, and others equally fails to meet the situation, for if consciousness is only the inner side of reality, and to it the subject is confined, how does he verify the existence of that other side which is forever inaccessible to him? What becomes of the phenomenon of error, which is apparently a type of consciousness to which no reality runs parallel?

It might seem that a dualistic doctrine would have a better chance of acceptance. Here the separateness and independence of mind and matter would seem to offer mind the degree of freedom necessary to make error possible, to allow mind on one hand to wander in its spontaneous constructions far enough from objective fact to present in imagination and thought entities which do not exist outside of mind, or on the other hand to close its own area of comprehension to a scope which would fail to see what actually is there in the universe.

But the basic difficulty with a dualistic ontology is that it never succeeds in meeting a crucial test. If there are minds independent of bodies why can not honest investigation point them out? Until tests of objective existence of disembodied minds can be as freely presented

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as inanimate bodies apparently are dualistic ontology will not satisfy the critic.

The consequence is that dualism cannot be employed as a basis for explanation of error. Minds do not evidently go their own ways losing entirely their holds upon reality, thus wandering into falsehood.

There still remain certain basic questions which must be answered by a satisfactory theory:

1. If on the one hand, the finite is never perfectly free from the infinite Ground of things how can it wander away far enough to be wrong in its impressions?

2. If on the other hand error is due to a certain looseness in the structure of Reality then what is the nature of the bond which ties the finite mind which is capable of error to the structure of the whole, so closely that the whole is the origin and ground of the finite, and the final destiny into which the part sinks back again?

The problem of error is clearly a phase of the problem of the One and the Many in the structure of Reality. The difficulty with excessive monism is that it stifles the possibility of error. This we reject not from the ethical point of view. If it could be made intelligible as interpretation of fact we could accept it even though counter to what we might approve. But our problem is not ethical; it is epistemological and ontological. Errors occur; and we ask: How is it possible that they should occur? What structure does a Reality have which allows this? On the other hand if there is no unity whatever how can any fact refer to any other?

If fatalism results from overemphasis upon unity and chaos from overemphasis upon plurality, how can the structure of the universe be described in such a way as to maintain the unity which actually exists, and at the same time the plurality which makes possible the disco-ördination of opinion which also actually occurs? The structure of the Real must be conceived in some such manner as is suggested in the work of Emile Boutroux entitled *Contingency in the Laws of Nature.*

Boutroux pointed out that the processes of the universe are in accord not with a single system of law, but rather with a system of systems. There is a contingency in the operation of each natural law. Each law becomes manifest if and when the conditions for its operation are fulfilled. By virtue of this situation it is possible for one law to supersede another. Certain laws have precedence over other laws just as in the electrochemical series of elements one substance takes precedence over another if the situation becomes competitive in the attempt to combine

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with another element. Similarly the law of gravity can be relegated to a secondary position in the behavior of objects. Thereby it becomes possible for structures heavier than air under certain conditions to rise from the ground by virtue of laws of nature other than the law of gravity.

The contingency of laws thus makes the universe less tight in its structure than pure mechanism declares it to be, and opens the way to the possibility of error and falsehood in the field of cognition.

A second suggestion comes from the philosophy of Whitehead. His organismic theory pictures the cosmos not as a single organism merely, but as an organism of organisms. The best analogy is that of the animal or human, composed of various sub-systems—osteal, muscular, nervous, etc. In the total organism each sub-system has its relatively distinguishable and unitary operation. And within each system the single cells arise, live their lives, and pass away, as do the cells of the blood stream, for example, apparently without reference to other systems of cells, and in independence of the behavior of the organism as a whole. Yet without the constituent elements the whole would not exist. And without the medium of the whole the relatively independent units could not live. Here is a kind of unity and of plurality which escapes both extremes of mechanism and chaos.

IV

Error is a situation which cuts the individual off from his fellow men and from the rest of the objective world-whole with which he is trying to deal. The subjective vagaries of individual impression and opinion are what have constituted the basis for skepticism from ancient times to the present. The question now comes: when through error one has once lost connection with the objective, how can it be re-established? What happened when the connection was severed? Or has it always been severed; did connection never really exist, as the skeptic maintains? The variety of individual opinion, apparently especially in philosophy, makes the problem of grasp of anything objective especially prominent.

In fact we face here the crucial problem of *solipsism*. Do we never escape it? Is this what Existentialism is telling us? If we do escape, how? The question has been treated usually in entirely too cavalier a way. But this very cavalier treatment indicates a conviction that the problem is too difficult to solve. It seems easier to skip it than to face it. (But no problem is ever solved by skipping it or by postulating that

it has been solved.) Says Windelband: "It (solipsism) is a metaphysical sport which must be left to the taste of the individual; for the solipsist refutes himself by beginning to prove his doctrine to others." But in this statement he overlooks an alternative interpretation. There are occasions when one thinks for the purpose of clarifying one's own mind; and this may conceivably be the motive in the analyses and discussions of the solipsist. The arguments he would use for this purpose would indeed be identical with those intended to clarify the mind of another. But after all thinking is sometimes "the soul's discourse with herself."

Descartes' solution of the problem of solipsism by way of theology is interesting, but not convincing. It is too indirect, and uses as a premise what is really a derivative concept—the idea of God. But if the analysis of experience, which finally leads to the conception of God, cannot lead more directly to belief in the objective world it is not satisfactory.

Bradley's treatment of the question involves assumptions and limitations which seem unnecessary. He regarded immediate experience as restricted to the momentary, the direct, sensory, non-ideal aspect of experience. It is the 'this,' immediately presented and felt as the 'now mine.' He spoke of existence beyond the moment as "beyond myself,' and said he was using the words commonly employed for such meanings. But is not our philosophical function to criticize and correct common usage? And to say, as he and others have, that I arrive at knowledge of other souls by means of knowledge of other bodies is to skip the entire question of verifying the existence of other bodies. Also, to say that my past self is related to me as another present self is ignores the unities that constitute different individuals. He deliberately ruled out the unity of myself which makes my memory possible and which does not include your experience in its scope.

Professor Ledger Wood's analysis of solipsism amounts in the end to the assertion that the solipsist cannot demonstrate the non-existence of being other than himself, because of the difficulty in establishing by empirical method the truth of a universal negative. But neither does this give any basis for asserting the particular affirmative. It remains as doubtful as its contradictory.

Nor can we be content with Professor Hinshaw's statement: "Private epistemically basic propositions can be given a public definition." This assumes the existence of a 'public,' whereas the solipsist's problem lies at this very point: "Is there a public?"; we do not establish the existence of a public by postulating it. If we assume it the assumption

is hypothetical and all succeeding discussion based upon it is hypothetical. But the issue is not what would be the situation if there were a public?, but "Is there a public?' and what analysis shows how the acknowledgment of a public is verified?"

Let us recall that in his *Sophist* Plato had made the suggestion that Being consists in the power to affect another or be affected by another, if only for a single moment, however trifling the cause, and however slight the effect.

Leibniz continues this suggestion in his view that the experience of 'force' is indispensable to our recognition of the existence of the physical world. This is an improvement, not only upon Descartes' characterization of the physical world as consisting in extension, but in the localization of the cognition of a physical realm in more direct experience.

The phraseology of Locke also, as he faces the question of the origin of experience, includes causal expressions such as: "objects do affect them"; "they (the senses) from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions."[4]

It is always through an experience of limitation in our own free activity that we come to a belief in the existence of something real beyond ourselves. Berkeley sums up the whole matter in the sentence: "But whatever power I may have over my own thoughts, I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a like dependence on my will. When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is not in my power to choose whether I shall see or no, or to determine what particular objects shall present themselves to my view, and so likewise as to the hearing and other senses; the ideas imprinted on them are not creatures of my will. There is therefore some *other* Will or Spirit that produces them."[5]

Some other term may be substituted for the word Will, or Spirit, but the central consideration remains the same. He might also have found as much evidence in the sense of being helped as in that of being hindered. But in either case the judgment is that something is occurring which I did not originate. As Russell has put it more recently: "What we directly experience might be all that exists, if we did not have reason to believe that our sensations have external causes."[6]

But why does experience lead to a reference beyond myself? Why

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[4]Essay, Book II, 1, 3.
[5]*Principles of Human Knowledge*, 29.
[6]*Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limitations*, p. 311.

not stop with the conviction that the obstacle is something within myself, an inner check? Why refer to it as an external reality?

It has been said that the very nature of mind is to be in a sense self-transcendent, that it differs from physical existence in this respect. But just what does self-transcendence mean and how far does it go? There is much vague talk about "externality," without clearly answering the question: External to what? Self-transcendence is apparently a special case of transcendence. We know what it is for one spatial area to transcend another in the sense of including and going beyond it. We know what it is to judge that a certain task transcends our powers in that it would take more skill and strength than we possess in order to accomplish it. But in neither case has the fact declared transcendent to another gone wholly beyond the field of attention and thought which is the scope of experience and of mind. When we speak of occurrences in the past or future we say, as Russell says, that we are transcending the present. But still we are not transcending the whole realm of time. If we speak of events in geological ages, or if with the astronomer we speak of those moments when the chemical elements were taking form we still have not transcended all time. Nor have we transcended the scope of thought for thought ranges over all the past and all the future. But we are now speaking of self-transcendence, which is both reflexive, in that the self is referring to itself; and it is complete in that the transcendence we now mean is transcendence of not only every *item* of experience, singly, but of the whole of experience itself.

A basic difficulty is that in spite of our denial of spatial character to the mind we are still haunted with lingering traces of spatiality. To be "in" mind is not to be some "where" fundamentally. To say that by any reference to time, space, or objective reality we have transcended the realm of mind is to say that we both are and are not attending to some thought-object at a given instant. The one thing we do transcend when we talk this way is the realm of meaningful discourse. We have come to rest in nonsense.

In other words, it is probably not true that mind transcends itself, whatever else it may transcend. So far solipsism is right. Critically considered, all discourse operates within the confines of mentality. Whether there is any reality beyond these confines is an unanswerable question. We may quote here another sentence of Berkeley, usually overlooked, even by Berkeley himself: "In short, if there were external bodies, it is impossible we should ever come to know it; and if there were not,

we might have the very same reasons to think there were that we have now."[7] We can not with the Realist say there are; nor with the Idealist say there are not; we must with Kant and the Critical Idealists down to Cassirer and all the Positivists say simply we do not and cannot know.

As we have said, mind does transcend any particular event which is within its ken; especially does thought transcend sensation. And one such sensory event with which we are constantly concerned is the body with which a given finite mind is most directly connected. But to transcend a given physiological organism is still not to transcend mind itself. The mind is not strictly in the body; rather the body is a segment of the sphere of experience which constitutes the mind's content. This complex of sensory content that is persistently with myself and is the relatively constant core of experience, that is most continuously a part of my experience, looms so large in my attention that I fall into the habit of identifying myself with it. So I become, if I am not critical of the situation, an empiricist of the sensory type, and what is commonly called a materialist. The common interpretation of transcendence is based upon an identification of myself with my body. But repeatedly in the history of thought reflection, especially upon the problem of knowledge, has led to the conviction that the commonsense view of my situation needs restatement. A Copernican Revolution is the inevitable consequence of reflection.

We have referred to several instances in which it has been held that it is through the experience of action and interaction that we become convinced of the existence of a real beyond our finite selves. Just how does interaction occur?

Without ignoring the problematic character of the concept of cause, let us note that in theories of causality other than the extremely positivistic, it has been commonly held that there is no exchange of influence possible except within a continuous field. Effects are their causes in a different form says A. E. Taylor. The cause passes into and becomes the effect. The interaction of spirit and matter has been declared unintelligible because no one has succeeded in reducing spirit to a form of physical energy, or vice versa.

If this is a valid principle then the causal interplay of the subjective and individual with the objective and general must be due to the existence of some kind of common denominator, some basic principle

[7] *Principles of Human Knowledge*, 20.

of continuity between the two. All monistic metaphysics holds this to be the case, whatever name is given to ultimate reality. The escape from solipsism through the concept of causality then means that so far as the ultimate unity is concerned there is a sense in which there never is any isolation. The isolation is with respect to certain details of reality, not with respect to the ultimately real. The only real solipsist is the total system of Reality, for beyond it there is nothing.

Protons and electrons have sometimes been interpreted on the analogy of stresses and strains in an all-pervading matrix of energy. So finite individuals may well be regarded as precipitates out of a universal solution of Reality.

Such a metaphor pictures the bond that ties all individuals to a background and an ancestry. But what about the distinctness which individuals themselves possess?

From the time of Aristotle the concepts of potentiality and actuality have been found useful in interpreting the continuity of the real. They have passed in a specialized way into the 'potential' and 'kinetic' energy of physical theory, the contrast of the energy of position with that of movement. They are helpful in stating certain aspects of psychological experience where we say a man has not made full use of his capabilities, and in formulating certain metaphysical problems, like the status of an event that might occur but is not occurring. Let us employ them here and say that in the vast field of the Real we have an area where potentialities and actualities lie distributed unevenly. The universal bond that ties all Being together is the total field of all possible alternative logical systems. Not all these possibilities have been actualized. Not all that have been partly actualized are completely so. There is an unevenness in the total structure, and some segments are not interacting actually with other segments. But over all spreads the Inclusive Universe of Discourse, the Universal Class to which all alternative systems and details are subclasses and members. As alternatives, even at some points mutually exclusive, they are still within the same Universal Class which contains all that is experienceable and thinkable.

From this point of view Truth is the actualization of another particular region of reality in cooperation with that actualization which I call my own individual mental activity. Falsehood, or error, is the actualization of my personal consciousness which meets no cooperation on the part of any other region of the real. Potentiality has passed into actuality only in me, not in any other part of the field that cooperates with me. My actuality stands alone.

Pragmatism has described truth and falsehood in terms of activity. So far it has given us something significant. But it has customarily couched its statements in terms which refer the present experience of an individual to the future of the same individual. In this respect Pragmatism has been too limited. It has unwittingly confined itself to a solipsistic realm. Thereby it has failed to make use of its own resources as a means of escaping subjectivity. It has spoken of action and assumed that there was no problem in the description of the interaction of the subjective and the objective. It ought to have magnified the suggestion of Plato, Leibniz, Locke, etc., that in the reflexive experience of the sense of limitation we find the key to the belief in an objective world. Pragmatism might then have escaped the subjective interpretations that some have placed upon it; and thus have avoided many of the criticisms directed toward it.

Let us place ourselves in the position which involves the process of interaction, and which makes myself one end of the relation. The hither end will be my own subjective experience; the farther will be the outer world with which I am dealing. Truth can then be interpreted in terms of successful action, and falsehood in terms of failure. But the test of truth will not be whether I gain the experience I wish for, nor whether I successfully anticipate some future experience of mine; but whether my experienced activity now fits in with the ongoings of the entire universe so as to preserve me as a factor in it. My survival and significance will be the crucial test of the truth of my plans of action. My pragmatism will be objective and immediate rather than subjective and remote.

From this point of view indeed, the truth of a proposition will not consist in copying anything or in representing something wholly beyond experience by symbols which are wholly within experience, as has been suggested from Plato's *Cratylus* to Lewis' *Investigation of Knowledge and Value* and Russell's *Human Knowledge, Its Scope and Limitations*. The truth of a sensory impression can never be tested by comparing it with some completely transcendent item; the real meaning of the conception will be in terms of successful interaction with the universe around.

This interpretation may still seem to leave us in the cell of solipsism, with individual mind 'referring' to something beyond, but pointing only. However, our suggestion that mind never transcends itself leads to the further proposition that mind is where its object is. Even when mind thinks the infinite it is at the infinite, though the full nature of

the infinite may not have become explicit. We may recall James' statement that "In some manner our consciousness is 'present' to everything with which it is in relation. I am *cognitively* present," says he, "to Orion whenever I perceive that constellation, but I am not *dynamically* present there, I work no effects."[8]

Looking at the problem from another angle let us recáll that the fundamental structure of falsehood has been described, as by Royce, Northrop and Blanshard, as failure to fulfil an intention. No symbol or representation is reprehensible as false except in the light of an aim that must be in mind when the accusation of falsehood is made. In the case of a wrong word or a false entry in an account it is impossible to say that the symbol is false unless it means something and unless there is an awareness of the meaning it was intended to express.

What is an intention? And how is it related to a symbol? "Expectation of a result in the light of which an action is adopted, is its *intent,*" says Lewis.[9]

The phrase 'in the light of which' I take to mean 'acceptance as the criterion for judgment.' In other words for 'truth' or 'falsehood' to have any possibility of determination there must be some kind of connection between the symbol and the object symbolized like the connection between an experience expected and an experience immediately undergone. If the symbol is an experience of mine which intends to refer to something transcendent to my immediate experience then there is no way of giving meaning to this intention except by way of a connection between my experience and its transcendent object like the connection just mentioned.

Two points are to be noted at once. The intention of the experience is not transcended by its object. The transcendence is only of one particular phase of experience by another particular phase. If the intent as possible is not the same as the intent as actualized then there can be no judgment of truth or falsehood. We cannot significantly say, "Your sketch doesn't look like a horse" to the one who replies: "But I never intended that it should." If it was never intended as such then as such it is neither true nor false; it is irrelevant.

Evidently there must be a principle of continuity between the intention unrealized and the intention realized, and it may well be conceived as analogous to an incomplete actualization of the potentialities

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[8]Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 214.
[9]*Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*, p. 366.

of a field of energy when distance is too great for a full correspondence of action to have been called forth.

The determination of both truth and falsehood implies a continuity which underlies the whole field of propositions, and constitutes a bond of unity for the universe. The propositions which are true, and those which are false, are judged by the same criteria. But in some cases the meaning of the propositions is actualized, in some it remains merely potential. All propositions mean to be true, as we have said. But where the truth claim of one fails to cooperate with the truth claim of another, each regards the other as false, and hypothetically it is false from the perspective of the one assumed to be true.

As for what makes one possibility become true and the other false,—we must say in Whiteheadian terms there is a factor of concrescence which effects the embodiment of a form in an instance, and this factor is what determines which of two formal possibilities is actualized. From the theoretical standpoint there are many, even infinitely many possible universes. Which one becomes actual is decided, as tradition would say, by the free choice of Omnipotence. Which one is the free choice of Omnipotence, only experience and history can tell. The present state of the total Real is analogous to the awakening being whose muscles and organs are tingling here and there with increasing consciousness, but whose parts are not yet so adjusted to each other that he can stand, walk, and act as a single unit. When this cooperation is fully realized each item of awareness will be true and will apply to the whole structure, not merely to a part.

The test of truth is pragmatic; but pragmatic with respect to the interplay of the elements of the entire universe, not merely with respect to the future of a limited part. The true is the expedient in an endlessly long run and in an infinite whole; the false is the inexpedient in this same long run, and with respect to this same totality.

V

A crucial problem still remains. After we have described the situation in which falsehood occurs, and the structure of a universe which allows it, there yet remains the problem of identification of instances of error. Here again come types of cases varying according to the different aspects of the truth situation. Such instances may involve the failure of an image to resemble a percept; the improper identification of a percept under a concept; the wrong use of linguistic symbols. But, as in the discussion of the most subtle and difficult type of definition,

there is the most interesting and difficult case of determining an instance of success or failure of consciousness to rightly signify a transcendent real, and especially interesting and important is the problem of determining when oneself is in error. Here one must apparently be able to assume the position of a third party to one's own judgment and the object of the judgment. One has to be plaintiff, defendant, and judge. This is the most difficult problem of all. It is hard for *me* to see that *I* can ever be wrong; and especially hard to identify the cases where I am.

The individualism represented by Plato's characterization of Protagoras takes a position which amounts to saying that since each man is the measure of all things no one can be in error. This, as we have said, apparently eliminates the possibility of falsehood.

In the *Meno,* Plato, as you recall, raised the question how any one may by himself know whether his opinion is correct or incorrect. He faces the dilemma that if he does not possess the truth by which to determine whether he is right or wrong he can never pass judgment upon himself; nor can he know how to select another's judgment as authority by which to measure his own opinion. But if he does possess this standard, why does he have to seek any truth? It is a discouraging problem that is apt to stop all inquiry, which now seems either unnecessary or hopeless.

Again in the *Theaetetus* he further comes to grips directly with the issue: How is it possible for me to know when I hold an erroneous opinion? I do not confuse something I really know with something else which I also know. If I really know things I have them clearly and correctly related; and there is no occasion, no possibility, of confusion. The relation can not be both clear and not clear. Nor is there occasion or possibility of confusion of what I know with what I do not know. My knowledge again precludes this. Neither can what I do not know be confused with what I know, for again knowledge precludes confusion. And concerning what I do not know I am not troubled even with confusion.

These are all the possible cases; and modern writers have not gone beyond Plato's analysis. Even if we try to insert degrees of knowledge the same possibilities would be repeated in connection with each degree. How then can my opinion be erroneous? Can I detect it when it is?

Zeno, the Stoic, sought to find an ultimate criterion for truth in his doctrine of the φαντασία καταληπτική. Seeing that a demand for evi-

dence for every point must lead to an infinite regress, he held that there are moments at which a compelling experience comes to one, giving the feeling of certitude that checks further pursuit. This is the moment at which one says: "I know."

But against this φαντασία καταληπτική Carneades raised the fatal objection that even though I have a strong conviction of certitude this is no final guarantee. Such a feeling of finality yet may be and often is mistaken.

In a similar manner this criterion might be applied to the question when I am perceiving an actually existent object and when I am subject to hallucination. This point could lead to many interesting considerations, for which we have not time.

When the realist says that he directly perceives not merely a sensory content or datum, but an 'object' which is the substrate or ground of the sensation, he must face this problem, in all its forms. If we are to be naïve in our theory of perception of an objective world in ordinary experience on the basis of vividness we must be equally so in connection with our illusions and hallucinations. Then we must believe that there is no difference between the objective reference of the insane and of the sane. What is believed objective by some experiencer is objective to all. We are back to Protagoras as Plato interpreted him.

A distinction of illusion from hallucination has at times been made on the basis of the locus of a stimulus without or within the body; but this, again, assumes that the problem of solipsism has been solved. It can hardly, therefore, be used as a basis for determining evidence for existence of a realm independent of consciousness. The proper order is the reverse.

Every opinion aims to be true and is held with the conviction that its claim is good. Certainly the tenacity with which people hold their positions indicates that this is the situation. Every one really holds the doctrine of Protagoras and Euthydemus that whatever opinion he entertains is true. One never says: I hold this opinion though I know it to be wrong. One says: I once held this opinion, but I now have come to know that it is erroneous. Or, I hold this opinion now, though future developments may show that after all it will prove to have been wrong. But at least acknowledgment of error is not made with respect to the immediate moment.

As we have already said, the distinction between the false and the true is essentially pragmatic, but pragmatic in the sense of referring

to the significance for my existence of some causal influences which I judge to be acting upon me now, and to which I am passive, or with which I am interacting.

That this too involves a judgment on my part is to be acknowledged. And as such it may be mistaken in the same way in which any judgment may be, though if judged mistaken it must be in the light of an intended object which is at least potentially there. It is mistaken about something. It is reaction to the possible as if it were real. If it be regarded as presenting a final error, it would be so only by setting up, also, a final criterion.

But objective, causal influence upon myself can not be fully tested at a single moment. I may judge that I am being acted upon by and reacting to some influence other than my own most immediate self, but I can not be sure of this until I live through enough time to see what course my larger experience takes. Only this can assure me whether I have been helped or hindered by the experience which I thought to be objective. I intend all my judgments to be true and shall hold that they are until I am compelled to admit that they are not.

The inevitable conclusion seems to be that there are no reliable instances of immediate finite certainty. Knowledge, truth and falsehood, from the finite point of view, are super-individual categories. As we said at the beginning, truth or falsehood refers an item of experience to something beyond it. But whereas the reference is sometimes taken as a reference beyond all conscious experience we are caught in a hopeless predicament which is in one phase always egocentric, though it is not so hopeless as to commit us to finite solipsism. Yet the escape from solipsism by way of action, as pointed out repeatedly in the idealistic tradition, while it gets us beyond finite isolation, does not get us wholly beyond the realm of conscious experience. It gets us either into a larger realm of consciousness continuous with ours (for *potential* consciousness is not wholly cut off from the realm of *actual* consciousness) or into a realm of unknowables. Which of these two is the last word absolutely we cannot tell, for there is no way in which to do so. The best we can do is enlarge ever increasingly the scope of our experience; but so long as we speak intelligibly we are still in a 'critically idealistic' realm. When we refer beyond this our utterances become meaningless, whether we assert with the idealist that consciousness covers all reality, or with the realist that there is reality beyond. Then, as Wittengenstein remarked: Wovon man nichts sagen kann darüber muss man schweigen.

UMI

VI

To sum up our meditation in the form of certain conclusions we may say:

1. Error is a fact, and an important phase of the structure of reality. Any ontology which excludes it is itself in error.
2. A completely deterministic theory, which presents so tightly-knit a structure that error is impossible is therefore an unacceptable theory; and whenever such a cosmology is offered we shall be justified in at once challenging it for an interpretation of the phenomenon of error.
3. On the other hand, however, a doctrine which presents so pluralistic a structure that those aspects of experience which are judged erroneous have *no* reference or connection with the rest of reality, must also be rejected as unconvincing.
4. Error, by its isolating effect, exposes us to the risk of solipsism, and makes necessary some interpretation of the way of escape, if we do escape.
5. This escape is found through pragmatic considerations.
6. But our pragmatism must itself be stated in other than finite individualistic terms, (an observation which would seem to be unnecessary were it not that so much discussion still is so stated.)
7. It must be reflexive in character, super-individual in dimension, and unlimited in scope.
8. To the question whether mind transcends itself, the answer must be negative, in order to avoid paradox and contradiction.
9. With this decision go theories of truth and error expressed in terms of either copying or representing something real beyond experience. Such theories could never be verified.
10. If subjectivism is to be escaped by interaction then the condition of interaction is important, namely, a common denominator to cause and effect.
11. This results in a monistic doctrine which brings what is called the finite self and the objective world into one continuous structure.
12. This common realm of reality is in its present condition, however, partly potential, partly actual.
13. The difference between truth and falsehood is a difference of degree of cooperation in actuality. Truth is pragmatic completeness; falsehood is pragmatic failure, which results in local actuality only.
14. Identification of instances in which I am in error is difficult because of the limitations of my finite actuality. Identification can come only by a larger realization of my connection with the rest of the universe.

No one can be certain of the correctness of his views at any present instant. Truth is social and its sociality can be shown only by a social test. That is what discussion is for. (The concrete application in the form of tolerance in attitude and modesty in claim is obvious.)

15. What our meditation seems to have done is, through the acknowledgement of the occurrence of error, to release us from the bondage of final mechanism or logical rigidity, while on the other hand, through the recognition of relevance to a criterion on the part of error and falsehood, to save us from the utter nihilism of complete pluralism.

16. We come in the end, by the path we have followed, to a theory very similar to those already held by some other thinkers. But our concern is not for novelty except insofar as the novelty is a self-revelation which is a contribution to and a constituent element in truth. A large part of the satisfaction of reaching the top of a mountain is to have climbed by a new path yet to have reached the same general view that others have attained before.

We have not yet, of course, reached the utmost height; more climbing is still ahead. Our theory demands an admission that because of our finitude complete understanding is not yet ours; we still aspire. To quote James again: "The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will ever alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine that all our temporary truths will some day converge." And to conclude, as we began, with Plato: " 'Wise' I may not call them, for that is a great name which belongs to God alone; 'lovers of wisdom' is their modest and befitting title."

The Ohio State University

Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association

1949-1950

TWENTY-THIRD ANNUAL REPORT OF THE BOARD OF OFFICERS

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF LEARNED SOCIETIES

The annual meeting of the American Council of Learned Societies was held in the Westchester Country Club at Rye, New York, on January 26 and 27, 1950. The American Philosophical Association was represented by its delegate, Glenn R. Morrow, and also by Cornelius Krusé, the Chairman of the Council. The meeting was mainly devoted to a review and discussion of the work of the Council during the past year, as presented in reports of its various committees and in reports of the Chairman and of the Executive Director, Charles E. Odegaard.

In his report the Director emphasized anew that the fundamental purpose of the Council is the encouragement of humanistic studies in America, not only in the organized fields represented by constituent societies, but also—and perhaps primarily—in the relatively uncultivated areas lying on the frontiers of existing university instruction and research. He cited in particular the report of the Committee on Near Eastern Studies, published in 1949, as presenting a notable program for the improvement of our facilities for understanding the peoples and cultures of the Near East. He announced that a new Joint Committee had been set up in co-operation with the Social Science Research Council to make similar plans for the development of South Asian Studies. One of the major ventures of the Committee on Slavic Studies during the past year was the establishment of the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press.* The *Digest* publishes each week some 70,000 words translated from Russian sources, including *Pravda* and *Izvestia.* Besides its Russian Translation Project, of which four volumes (published by Macmillan) have appeared, this committee has also developed the *Current Soviet Thought Series,* published in near-print form by the Public Affairs Press, of which the latest number is the much publicized *Out of the Crocodile's Mouth,* a collection of cartoons about American life that have appeared in the famous Soviet magazine of humor. Committees on Far Eastern Studies, on Negro Studies, on Musicology, on American Civilization, on Renaissance Studies, on the History of Religions, have been equally busy in their various areas, with the assistance of Council officers; and the Director ended this part of his report by asserting that the Council has a continuing obligation to be on the alert for new and important objectives in humanistic studies.

The Council continues to be deeply concerned with the problem of recruiting and preparing competent personnel in the humanistic fields. The Director announced with satisfaction the appointment of Mr. J. Fletcher Wellemeyer, formerly connected with the Federal Security Agency, as Staff Adviser

on Personnel Studies. Through its fellowship programs the Council continues to be active in the support of individuals who promise to develop into successful teachers of the humanities. First-year graduate fellowships were awarded for the first time for the academic year 1949-50. There are twenty-three Fellows from twenty-one institutions now attending eleven graduate schools. There are also twenty-eight advanced Fellows, chosen in large part because of the interdisciplinary character of their programs, which makes them less eligible for appointment to the usual university and graduate school fellowships. During the past year the Council has given special study to the problem of aiding the individual scholar after he has completed his period of graduate training. As one result of this study, a new program of Faculty Study Fellowships has been established, to enable scholars at roughly the assistant professor level to broaden their intellectual range through study of a field which has not been an important part of their previous training. The first awards under this new program will be made for the academic year 1950-51.

As is only too well known, the Council's grants in aid of publication, which had been a part of its program since 1925, had to be suspended in 1948 because of the unwillingness of the Foundations to renew grants for such a purpose. The Council, however, has been attempting to assist publication in other ways particularly through the work of Mr. Henry Silver, as the Council's Staff Adviser on Publication. Mr. Silver has devoted himself to the problem of reducing the costs of short-run books, through modifications in some current practices of authors, editors, printers, publishers and readers. His articles in various journals have aroused much interest, and his advisory conferences with officers of constituent societies have stimulated new thought and in some cases have materially alleviated the difficulties of scholarly publication.

But it remains a matter of great concern that the Foundations have ceased to be willing to make grants for assistance to the publication of individual manuscripts. They seem quite willing to make grants for cooperative projects, even when these are no more than plans on paper. It is this delegate's opinion that the Foundations are obsessed by certain delusions in favor of "collective enterprise" and "co-operative research," to the neglect of the individual scholarly worker. Means should be found to impress upon them the fact that the solitary thinker—the "lone wolf," as he was called in the lively discussion of this issue on the floor of the Council—is one of our most precious assets and deserves to be properly supported.

GLENN R. MORROW

COMMITTEES

Permanent Committee on Bibliography

During 1949 the Secretary of your committee has continued to supply American titles to the office of the *International Bibliography* in Paris. He has also made special efforts to distribute subscription blanks for the *International Bibliography* among American libraries. The editor of the *Bibliography,* Raymond Bayer, has prepared a report and distributed it to all subscribers. This report reveals that members of the American Philosophical Association and American libraries have made a substantial contribution toward the support of this Bibliography and have made its continuance possible. UNESCO, which is

continuing to support it, has requested the International Institute of Philosophy to raise the subscription price in order to bring it in line with the prices of other bibliographies sponsored by UNESCO. Accordingly, the subscription price for 1950 (covering the publications of the year 1949) will be five dollars. This price is reduced to four dollars for members of the Associations belonging to the International Federation of Philosophical Societies.

In September, 1949, the Chairman of your committee had an opportunity to discuss the problem of perfecting the *Bibliography* with Professor Bayer and his colleagues. It became clear in the course of these discussions that the regional offices should take more responsibility in gathering and forwarding titles to the central office. It is impossible for the office in Paris to cover more than the professional philosophical journals. At the same time it is clear that many important articles are published in various periodicals which are not exclusively devoted to philosophy. Some scheme must be devised whereby such articles will be brought to the attention of the compilers. There are other practical problems which must be solved if the *Bibliography* is to be thoroughly satisfactory.

During the spring of 1950, when the Chairman will be in Paris, these problems will be discussed in detail and recommendations made to the members of the Bibliography Committee. On the basis of these recommendations your Committee hopes to make plans during 1950 for a more accurate, comprehensive, and efficient bibliographical service. These plans will be reported next year and may lead to a request for the services of more members of the Association. Every effort will be made to perfect the *International Bibliography*.

This bibliography is still operating on a considerable deficit and subscriptions are solicited. Members of the Association will render service both to the *Bibliography* and to the libraries of their respective institutions if they will inform these libraries that the *Bibliography* is now on a regular and permanent basis and that academic libraries should be subscribers to it.

In response to requests from publishers, the Secretary of your committee has prepared a book exhibit of recent publications in philosophy for the meeting of the Eastern Division at Clark University, and the books contributed for this exhibit are being shipped to the University of Mexico, where they will be exhibited in connection with the Third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy, January 11-20, 1950.

For the Committee,
HERBERT W. SCHNEIDER, *Chairman*

Publication Committee

Professor Gregory D. Walcott, General Editor of Source Books in the History of the Sciences, has submitted the following report:

The sales of the *Source Book in Greek Science* by Cohen and Drabkin have been very gratifying thus far. Somewhat over 1,200 copies were disposed of in the first eleven months after it came from the press. The reviews have also been very favorable. Dr. George Sarton in *Isis* for August, 1949 expressed his reaction to the volume in a laudatory way. His concluding paragraph is especially significant. "The publication of this very good book," he says, "is exceedingly welcome to me, as it will be to every scholar who is obliged to lecture on the history of ancient science. . . . My teaching has been made hitherto very difficult because of the lack of a book like this one. . . . When I must offer that course again"—which he does every other year—"I shall request

every student to obtain, if possible, a copy of the Cohen-Drabkin Source Book and my teaching will be largely adapted to it and far more efficacious than it has been."

The Source Book in Zoology is now coming through the press and should be on the market early in 1950. The manuscript for the *Source Book in Chemistry* is nearing completion. Dr. Leicester, who has charge of that work, has written that he expects to place it in the hands of the publishers by January of the coming year. Professor Marshall Clagett of the University of Wisconsin has joined forces with Professor McKeon of the University of Chicago in the development of the *Source Book in Medieval Science*. A prospect, too, of completing the *Source Book in Botany*, which has been a knotty problem, is in the offing, but nothing more may be said at present. Steps are also being taken toward the preparation of a *Source Book in Twentieth Century Science*, 1900-1950. The series as a whole grinds along, although at times it seems to be going very slowly.

During the year four manuscripts were considered by the Publication Committee for possible recommendation to the American Council of Learned Societies for grants in aid of publication. Two manuscripts, one entitled *Theory of Order* by W. Donald Oliver, and the other *From the Academy to Neo-Platonism* by Philip Merlan, were unconditionally recommended for such a grant. On September 2, however, these activities were nullified and brought to a halt by official word from the A.C.L.S. that its committee on grants in aid had been discharged because of the exhaustion of its funds. There is a general desire that the grants may be resumed at some future time, but there is no assurance that they will be.

Thus our Association, if its activities in aid of publication in the field of philosophy are to continue on a substantial basis in the immediate future, finds itself faced with the necessity of seeking funds from some source other than the A.C.L.S. A number of suggestions have been made, such as applying to a foundation for an additional revolving fund for publications in philosophy, the financing of such publications from our own treasury, and so on. Such proposals should receive immediate consideration as soon as the national organization of the Association is placed upon a firmer basis. A progress report from Mr. H. M. Silver, A.C.L.S. Staff Adviser on Publications, concerning the latest developments in the methods of scholarly publishing, is likely to be useful in this connection. Members of our Association who are faced with publishing problems involving the new techniques of printing and filming should not hesitate to consult Mr. Silver, whose office is at 425 West 117th St., New York City.

In the course of the year, three anonymous donations to the Publication Committee (of $50, $25, and $25) were received for the purpose of establishing a revolving fund to aid publication in philosophy, and for which the Committee wishes to express its gratitude. A much larger sum, amounting to at least five thousand dollars, is urgently needed, and the Committee would appreciate the aid of any member of the Association in securing it. With the greatly increased costs of publishing, it is clear that there are a number of excellent manuscripts in philosophy which are unlikely to be published without the aid of a subsidy, yet which, if carefully selected and presented, would return sufficient income to insure that a revolving fund would revolve. Until substantial funds are available, the activities of the Committee must be confined to the service of rendering opinions on manuscripts to individuals or publishers who may wish such service from the Association.

For the Committee,
HAROLD A. LARRABEE, *Chairman*

Committee on International Cooperation

The Association has in the last year arranged for two Latin-American philosophers to receive appointments from universities and colleges in this country in accordance with the provisions of a Rockefeller grant awarded to the Association for the purpose of bringing visiting professors from Latin America to teach in North American colleges and universities, and also to provide grants-in-aid to philosophers in Latin America for specific studies which give promise of fostering a better knowledge of Latin-American philosophy. Professor Risieri Frondizi, formerly professor of philosophy at the University of Tucuman in the Argentine, was visiting professor at Yale in the first semester of the academic year 1949-50. Professor José Vasconcelos, well-known philosopher and a leading educator in Mexico, having been Mexico's first Minister of Public Instruction after the Revolution of 1910, was visiting lecturer in many universities and colleges from coast to coast from October 16 to November 17, during which time the Association arranged for him to speak on Mexican philosophy at Haverford, the University of California, Mills College, the University of New Mexico, the University of Denver, Boston University, Wellesley, Tufts, Wesleyan, Yale, Wells College, Cornell University, the University of North Carolina, and the University of Missouri.

Leopoldo Zea, distinguished research scholar in the field of Mexican and Latin-American philosophy, has been awarded a research fellowship under the Rockefeller grant for the purpose of continuing his important work on the history of philosophy in Mexico.

In previous years Professors Euryalo Cannabrava, Clarence Finlayson, and Riseri Frondizi were appointees under the Association's Latin-American grant, at Columbia, the University of North Carolina, the University of Pennsylvania, and Swarthmore College, respectively. Professor Frondizi successively held a visiting professorship at the two last-mentioned institutions.

The Third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy was held in Mexico during January 11-20 of this year, with about a dozen North American philosophers in attendance and participating. The Fourth Congress will be held in Havana, Cuba, in 1953, in honor of the centenary of the birth of José Martí. The Constitution and By-Laws for the Federation of North and South American Philosophical Societies are in process of being drafted.

The Second East-West Philosophers' Conference was held in Honolulu from June 20-July 29, 1949. Forty-seven philosophers from Ceylon, India, China, Japan, England, the United States mainland and Hawaii participated. A new philosophical journal, to be called *Journal of Comparative Philosophy,* whose purpose is to make Eastern philosophy better known in the West, and vice versa, is in process of being launched. The Indian Philosophical Society will celebrate its Silver Jubilee in December of this year and has requested participation by North American delegates.

Correspondence between the chairman and members of the Committee and philosophers the world round is steadily increasing.

For the Committee,

CORNELIUS KRUSÉ, *Chairman*

AUDIT REPORT

Yellow Springs, Ohio
May 8, 1950

Professor George R. Geiger, Secretary-Treasurer
American Philosophical Association
Yellow Springs, Ohio

Dear Sir:

I have made an examination of your records for the year ended May 1, 1950, and submit herewith my report consisting of this letter and the following exhibits:

EXHIBIT A—Summary of Cash Receipts and Disbursements for the year ended May 1, 1950.

EXHIBIT B—Reconciliation of Fund Balances to Securities and Cash in Bank as at May 1, 1950.

The amount of cash on hand at May 1, 1950 has been verified by correspondence with your depositories. Securities in the form of United States Treasury Bonds, Series G, were inspected at the Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio.

All receipts were compared with bank deposits and all disbursements were evidenced by cancelled checks or supporting vouchers.

In my opinion, the attached statements fairly reflect the results of activity for the year ended May 1, 1950.

Respectfully submitted,
D. A. MAGRUDER, *Public Accountant*
Professor of Accounting, Antioch College

EXHIBIT A

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
Summary of Cash Receipts and Disbursements
for the Year Ended May 1, 1950

	General Treasury	*Revolving Fund for Publication*	*Rockefeller Fund*
Fund Balances, May 1, 1949	$1,480.11	$11,736.56	$ 6,526.86
Cash Receipts:			
Dues and Pro-rata Cost of Proceedings:			
Eastern Division— 1949	782.88		
Western Division— 1949	604.26		
Pacific Division— 1949	198.14		
Eastern Division— 1950 (dues)	383.50		
Sale of Proceedings	4.50		
Additional Contribution to International Federation from Western Division	9.33		
Anonymous Gift for Special Publication Fund		100.00	
Royalties—from McGraw-Hill Book Company		145.11	
Interest on U.S. Treasury Bonds and Savings Account		128.20	
From Fees from Universities for Vasconcelos' Lectures			250.00
From Rockefeller Foundation			10,000.00
Total Cash Receipts	1,982.61	373.31	10,250.00
Total Cash Available	3,462.72	12,109.87	16,776.86

Note: Interest accrued on U.S. Treasury Bonds in the amount of $97.50 due May 1, 1950 was deposited to the revolving Fund for Publication on May 2, 1950.

	General Treasury	*Revolving Fund for Publication*	*Rockefeller Fund*
Total Cash Available	$3,462.72	$12,109.87	$16,776.86
Cash Disbursements:			
Printing Proceedings—Cornell Univ. Press	695.20		
Printing Proceedings—Humphrey Press	633.54		
Dues—American Council of Learned Societies	45.00		
Dues—International Federation	30.90		
Postage	15.00		
Telephone and Telegraph			14.69
Reprints of International Bibliography of Philosophy	19.03		
Bank Charges and Safe Deposit Box Rental	4.80		
Stationery, printing, and Supplies	36.61		
Audit Expense— 1949	22.50		
Publication Committee Expenses—to H. Larrabee		23.43	
Expenses on Source Book in Geology—to K. F. Mather		344.50	
To Leopold Zea			2,200.00
To José Vasconcelos			1,908.80
To Risieri Frondizi			3,000.00
Total Disbursements	1,502.58	367.93	7,123.49
Fund Balances, May 1, 1950	1,960.14	11,741.94	9,653.37

EXHIBIT B

THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

Reconciliation of Fund Balances to Securities and Cash in Bank as of May 1, 1950

Summary of Fund Balances:	
General Treasury	$ 1,960.14
Revolving Fund for Publication	11,741.94
Rockefeller Fund	9,653.37
Total All Funds	$23,355.45
Summary of Securities and Cash in Bank:	
United States Treasury Bonds, Series G (in safe deposit vault at Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio)	$ 7,800.00
Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio, checking account	1,280.78
Miami Deposit Bank, Yellow Springs, Ohio, savings account number 4275	4,621.30
Middletown National Bank, Middletown, Connecticut, checking account	9,653.37
Total Securities and Cash in Bank	$23,355.45

Report of the Secretary of the Board of Officers

The problem of possible reorganization of the Association is still of concern to the board. A committee of past and present board members, with Milton C. Nahm as chairman, devised a new constitution for the association which, in principle, has been adopted by the Eastern and Western divisions but has been rejected by the Pacific division. The proposed constitution is printed here to serve as possible material for any future discussions.

PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FOR AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION

[This Constitution shall replace the present Constitution. It shall become effective when accepted by vote of the Eastern, Western, and Pacific Divisions of the American Philosophical Association. It is agreed among the Divisions that if this Constitution be deemed unsatisfactory to any or to all divisions after a period of five years from its acceptance, the Association shall revert to the present Constitution.]

Article I—Name and Object

1. The name of this organization shall be the American Philosophical Association.

2. Its object shall be the promotion of the interests of philosophy in all its branches in the national and international fields and the interrelation of such affairs of its constituent divisions as are national or international in scope.

Article II—Official Address

1. The address of the duly elected Secretary-Treasurer shall be the official address of the Association.

Article III—Meetings

1. National or international meetings may be called by direction of the Executive Committee. In cooperation with one or more of its constituent divisions, such national or international meetings may be coordinated with divisional meetings.

2. Each constituent division shall normally hold an annual meeting.

Article IV—Officers

1. The Administrative Body of the Association shall be the Executive Committee.

2. Constitution and Manner of Election.

A. The Executive Committee shall consist of the following:

i. The duly elected Secretary-Treasurers of the constituent divisions, each to serve for the period of his divisional term of office;

ii. One member of each constituent division, elected by his division, to serve for four years from the date of election;

iii. Three members, no more than one of whom shall be from the same constituent division, to be elected by a mail vote taken in December of all members of the Association, from a panel nominated by the Executive Committee, and to serve for three years from the date of election.

B. The officers of the Executive Committee shall be a Chairman and a Secretary-Treasurer.

i. The Chairman shall be elected by the committee from its own membership. The first Chairman may be a member of any constituent division, but thereafter the chairmanship shall rotate among the divisions in the following sequence: Western Division, Pacific Division, Eastern Division, Western Division, etc. The chairman shall serve for two years, or until the expiration of his term of membership in the Executive Committee, if that occurs earlier.

For the purposes of initial organization, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Western Division shall be temporary chairman of the Executive Committee, and shall call the committee together for the election of its regular chairman as above prescribed.

ii. The Secretary-Treasurer shall be elected by the committee from its own membership. He shall serve for three years, or until the expiration of his membership in the Executive Committee, if that occurs earlier; and he shall be eligible for re-election on the same terms.

3. Duties of the Executive Committee

1. The Executive Committee shall transact all legal business for the Associa-

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tion and shall administer the assets and funds now or hereafter belonging to the Association.

2. The Executive Committee shall act for the Association as a whole in the election or appointment of delegates or representatives to the American Council of Learned Societies, the International Federation, or similar soceties and organizations.

3. The Executive Committee shall elect members and determine the annual dues of members, subject to ratification by mail-vote of the membership. The dues shall be collected by its duly elected Secretary-Treasurer.

4. The Executive Committee shall be responsible for financing the work of the Association and the normal divisional expenses.

5. The Executive Committee shall send announcements of all constituent divisional meetings and shall print programs and abstracts (if desired) of divisional meetings.

6. The Executive Committee shall appoint all standing committees.

7. Meetings of the Executive Committee may be called by the Chairman at any time or place that he may deem advisable.

4. Duties of Chairman and Secretary-Treasurer

1. The Chairman shall perform all duties of an executive or administrative nature which pertain to his office.

2. The Secretary-Treasurer shall keep a record of all proceedings of the Executive Committee; and be custodian and receive all moneys of the Association; and shall collect all dues from members.

Article V—Constituent Divisions

1. The Constituent Divisions shall consist of the Eastern, Western, Pacific, and such others as shall be recognized by the Executive Committee.

2. Constituent Divisions shall be responsible for

a) electing members of the Executive Committee according to Article IV, Section 2

b) the election of divisional officers

c) the planning of divisional meetings and preparation of divisional programs

d) formulating and presenting recommendations for action by the Executive Committee

e) all other purely divisional business.

Article VI—Membership

1. There shall be three classes of members: full members, associate members and life members.

Full membership. Eligibility to full membership shall be limited to the following classes of persons:

a) Persons whose training in philosophy has been advanced and systematic enough to make them competent to teach the subject at the college or university level. *Prima facie* evidence of such competence will ordinarily be considered afforded by possession of a Ph.D. degree in philosophy from a reputable American university or from some foreign university having like standards; or by successful teaching of philosophy over a number of years with the rank of instructor or higher in a college of good academic standing.

b) Persons who have published contributions, whether in philosophy itself or in borderline fields, which in the opinion of the Executive Committee are of substantial value to philosophy.

Associate membership. Persons who are ineligible to full membership, but whose interest or achievements in philosophy are regarded by the Executive Committee as warranting their affiliation with the Associtaion, shall be eligible to Associate

membership. Associate members shall be entitled to all of the privileges of full membership except voice and vote in its business meetings.

Any member may become a *life member* of the Association by vote of the Executive Committee and on fulfillment of conditions for life membership fixed by the Executive Committee.

2. A candidate for membership must be proposed by two members of the Association.

3. A member of the American Philosophical Association may signify the Constituent Division to which he wishes to belong as a voting member .

4. A member of the American Philosophical Association may participate in the activities of the Association wherever he chooses to do so.

Article VIII—Publications

1. The Association shall publish annually the proceedings and presidential addresses of the constituent divisions, together with the combined list of members, report of the Executive Committee, and such other material as policy shall prescribe and financial resources permit.

2. The Proceedings shall be in charge of the Secretary-Treasurer and the Committee on Publications.

3. The Secretary-Treasurer shall furnish a copy of the Proceedings to each member of the Association.

4. The Association shall set aside a suitable sum for the establishment of a revolving fund for publication, to be administered by its Publication Committee.

Article VIII—Amendments

1. Amendments to this constitution, which must be submitted in writing, may be made by a concurrent two-thirds majority vote of the members of each constituent division present at its regular annual meeting or by a two-thirds vote of the mail vote, provided that the mail vote represents at least two-thirds of the Associatoin.

Article IX—General

1. In order to administer the affairs of the Association until the Constitution has been accepted by the Constituent Divisions, the Board of Officers which assumes office in January, 1950, shall assume responsibility and it is recommended that it appoint the members of the Board of Officers serving for the year 1949 in a consultative capacity.

The board unanimously re-elected George R. Geiger as secretary-treasurer for a three-year term beginning January 1, 1950. At his request, he was given the option of retiring before the end of his term if the press of duties became too great.

For the Board of Officers,
GEORGE R. GEIGER, *Secretary-Treasurer*

EASTERN DIVISION

President: Arthur E. Murphy
Vice-President: Willard V. Quine
Secretary-Treasurer: Milton C. Nahm
Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and Walter T. Stace *ex officio* for one year, Max Black (1950), Sidney Hook (1950), Lewis W. Beck (1951), Glenn R. Morrow (1951), Richard B. Brandt (1952), H. T. Costello (1952).

The forty-sixth meeting of the Eastern Division was held at Clark University in Worcester, Mass., December 27, 28, 29, 1949. The following program was presented:

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Symposium

The Emotive Conception of Ethics (Chairman, W. T. Stace)
Speakers: Charles L. Stevenson, Richard B. Brandt, Sidney Hook

Plenary Session

History of Philosophy (Chairman, Fulton H. Anderson)
The Essential Place of Nicholas of Cusa in the History of Philosophy ..... Anna Forbes Liddell
Comteanism in the Americas ..... Marjorie S. Harris
Reid's Epistemological Monism ..... Sidney C. Rome
Hume on Causality and Perception ..... Hans Jonas

Presidential Address

Naturalism and Religion ..... Walter T. Stace

Concurrent Sessions

Induction as a Method (Chairman, Sidney Hook)
On Aristotle's Theory of Induction ..... Lewis M. Hammond
A Modernistic Approach to Hume's Theory of Induction and Causation ..... Hugues Leblanc
Bertrand Russell on the Justification of Induction ..... W. H. Hay
Induction—Probable or Politic? ..... Donald C. Williams

Existence as a Philosophical Concept (Chairman, Max Black)
Is Existence a Valid Philosophical Concept? ..... William M. Walton
Is Existence a Valid Philosophical Concept? ..... John E. Smith
Eight Logically Clear Meanings of "To Be" ..... Frederic B. Fitch

Concurrent Sessions

Ethical Theory (Chairman, Glenn R. Morrow)
The Emotive Theory and Rational Methods in Moral Controversy ..... Asher Moore
Word Magic and Logical Analysis in the Field of Ethics ..... E. M. Adams
Ethical Disagreements and the Emotive Theory of Values ..... Vincent Tomas
Does Hume's Theory of Knowledge Determine His Ethical Theory? ..... Kingsley Price

The Basis and Character of Aesthetic Definition (Chairman, Milton C. Nahm)
The System of Values for an Aesthetic of Music ..... Julius Portnoy
The Form-Content Distinction in Contemporary Aesthetic Theory ..... Morris Weitz
On Beauty and Duty ..... Douglas N. Morgan
Two Levels of Aesthetic Definition ..... Katharine Gilbert

Meeting of the Association for Symbolic Logic
(Chairmen, Alice Ambrose Lazerowitz, Ernest Nagel)
Report on Some Investigations Concerning the Consistency of the Axiom of Reducibility ..... John Myhill
Possibilities of Proving Relative Consistency ..... Hao Wang
On Carnap's Analysis of Statements of Assertion and Belief ..... Alonzo Church
Arithmetical Problems and Recursively Enumerable Predicates ..... Martin Davis
Type-theory vs. Set-theory ..... John G. Kemeny
Some Suggestions Concerning Metaphysics of Logic ..... C. I. Lewis

The Logic of Causal Propositions.....Arthur W. Burke
The Inconsistency or Redundancy of *Principia Mathematica*.Irving M. Copi
On the Truth Concept and Recursions.....R. M. Martin

Papers Presented by Title

Algebraical Treatment of Some Functional Calculi of First Order.....Helena Rasiowa
A Formal System of Logic.....Hao Wang

Group Meetings

The Association for Realistic Philosophy

American Neo-Realism and Critical Realism.....Frank Parker

The Personalist Discussion Group

A Personalistic Critique of Marx.....Walter G. Muelder

The annual Business Meeting was held at 11:00 A.M., December 29, with President Stace presiding. (A special meeting for the consideration of resolutions was held December 28, with the discussion continued at the regular Business Meeting.)

The minutes of the forty-fifth annual meeting were approved as printed.

The following Treasurer's Report was read and approved:

FINANCIAL STATEMENT: December 23, 1948 to December 23, 1949

Receipts:		
Balance on hand, December 23, 1948:		
Book value of government bonds	$1,500.00	
Commercial account	728.19	
Membership dues	2,318.98	
Interest on government bonds	37.50	
Repayment, from American Philosophical Association to Eastern Division, of loan for Second Inter-American Congress	275.00	$4,859.67
Expenditures:		
National dues for 1949	$ 349.50	
Cost of 1948-49 *Proceedings*	782.88	
Expenses of officers and committees	353.77	
Secretarial assistance	164.44	
Printing (including 1949 programs) and mimeographing	186.60	
Committee on Information Service	150.00	
International Federation of Philosophy	69.90	
International Committee on Philosophy	15.90	
Expenses of speakers, Problems of World Society, University of Virginia	70.00	
Expenses, forty-fifth meeting	121.40	
Bank charges	2.61	
Postage and stationery	194.22	$2,460.82
Balance on hand		$2,398.85

The Auditing Committee, Francis P. Clarke and John S. Adams, Jr., reported that the Treasurer's Report had been examined and found correct.

The following Memorial Minutes were read, and by a rising vote were adopted and ordered printed in the *Proceedings*:

ERICH FRANK

Dr. Erich Frank had a singular but precious gift. He united with distinction domains and powers usually kept far apart. He was a brilliant historian and an original philosopher, a careful classicist and a daring theologian, an exciting teacher and a thorough scholar, a soldier and a thinker, at home in Europe and in America. Born on June 6th, 1883 in Prague, he received his Ph.D. at Heidelberg in 1910, was a captain in the Austrian army from 1914-18, a professor of philosophy at Heidelberg from 1923-28, and held a chair in philosophy at Marburg from 1928-36. Dismissed because of the Nurenberg laws, he came to America where he was successively research associate in philosophy at Harvard (1939-42), lecturer in Greek at Bryn Mawr (1944-45); visiting professor of philosophy, Bryn Mawr, (1945-48) and professor of philosophy, University of Pennsylvania (1948—). He died in Amsterdam on June 22d, 1949, in his sixty-sixth-year.

Dr. Frank was internationally known for his *Plato und die sogennanten Pythagoreer* (1923) which traces the Pythagorean influence on Plato. The work is shot through with insight and perceptive asides, bringing to bear on the problem a considerable knowledge of mathematics and music, metaphysics, history and culture. In this country he is perhaps best known for his *Philosophic Understanding and Religious Truth*, the Flexner Lectures given at Bryn Mawr in 1942-43, in which he combined his vast erudition with speculation, to forge an existentially-toned yet metaphysically alert defense of religion. To his friends and students he stood out as a sensitive, incredibly considerate, speculative and thoughtful human being. He was one of those men whose departure leaves a hole in the universe, marking the loss of a man who thought as a philosopher and lived as one.

PAUL WEISS
GLENN MORROW
GRACE A. DE LAGUNA

JOSEPH EARL LEDDEN

June 10, 1921 - May 18, 1949

On May 18th, 1949, at the age of twenty-seven, Joseph Earl Ledden died of a heart attack at his home in South Hadley, Massachusetts. He had known since childhood that he had a serious heart condition and it was characteristic of his courage and philosophy that he lived the few years that were given him in fullness of joy and enthusiastic pursuit of wisdom.

Valedictorian of his class when he graduated from Union College in 1943, he went on to complete his doctorate work in the field of philosophy at Brown University in 1946, when he was appointed Instructor at the University of Vermont. The following year he became an Assistant Professor at Mount Holyoke College, where he remained until his untimely death. His thesis was on "The Nature of Philosophical Problems": an abstract of it was published in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* in December, 1948. Articles of his have appeared posthumously in *The Journal of Philosophy* and *The Philosophical Review*.

He married Mildred E. Mattice in 1943 and for almost six years of companionship shared with her an intimacy and devotion that few are privileged to experience. The most thoughtful and tender of husbands, he found in his home a happiness which entered every part of his being. He was a man of rare human qualities of sincerity and friendship, and those who knew him were fortunate.

Joseph Ledden was a scholar of distinction and a teacher who gladly taught. His stduents were his friends and their problems his. He gave himself untiringly to his classes; enjoyed entertaining his students in his home. He had the intellectual curiosity and integrity of the true philosopher and all who sat down with him were made better by the touch of his mind and heart.

ROGER W. HOLMES

LEICESTER CROSBY LEWIS

The Rev. Dr. Leicester Crosby Lewis, a member of the American Philosophical Association since 1929, died March 19, 1949 in his vicarage at 477 Hudson Street, New York City, at the age of 61 years.

Dr. Lewis was born in New York and graduated from Columbia University in 1910. In 1912, he received his Bachelor of Divinity Degree from the General Theological Seminary and from 1912 to 1914 studied at the Universities of Berlin, Tubingen and Freiburg. He held the degrees of Doctor of Philosophy from the University of Pennsylvania, Doctor of Sacred Theology from Columbia, and Doctor of Civil Law from the Philadelphia Divinity School.

At the time of his death, Dr. Lewis was president-general of the Clerical Union for the Maintenance and Defense of Catholic Principles; co-editor of the *Anglican Theological Review,* which he and the Rev. Dr. S. A. E. Mercer founded in 1918; and vicar of St. Luke's Chapel, Trinity Parish, New York City.

Dr. Lewis was "a deeply and widely learned scholar, indisputably the Episcopal Church's best all-round scholar . . . the Episcopal Church's most trusted theological and spiritual counsellor of the past decade and a half." His principal scholarly interest was in ecclesiastical history, but he was also genuinely interested in philosophy, principally in Kantian and Neo-Kantian speculation.

MILTON C. NAHM

CHARLES GRAY SHAW

Charles Gray Shaw, Professor Emeritus of Philosophy at New York University died on July 28th, 1949. Born June 23rd, 1871 in Elizabeth, N.J., he was of colonial ancestry, being ninth in descent from Cohn Alden. In 1894 he received the B.L. degree from Cornell University, the Ph.D. from New York University in 1897 and in the same year a B.D. from Drew Theological Seminary. Like many older scholars he studied in Germany, specifically, in his case, at the Universities of Jena and Berlin in 1897-99. Appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy at New York University in 1899, he served as Professor of Philosophy from 1904 to 1941, when he retired from teaching.

Professor Shaw was a gifted lecturer with unusual resources of learning, eloquence and insight. Provided with a rare sense of humor he could communicate to his audience a feeling of abounding vitality and humanity. Being known (in the phrase of the New York Times) as a 'homespun epigrammatist' he was often quoted in the press and on occasion contributed to the gaiety of nations by remarks, one of which especially caused Mussolini to erupt in indignation. Beneath his wit there was a foundation of serious and solid philosophy which was both classical and humanistic. In doctrine he could have been classified as an idealist in the broader sense of the term. Always an admirer and thorough student of the Kantian system, he also apparently derived some inspiration from the work of Rudolf Eucken. His interest extended to all parts of philosophy and also to the history of art, literature and civilization. He cultivated logic, ethics aesthetics, the philosophy of religion and the history of civilization and he published books in most of these fields. Among the most important of his works are probably: ***Christianity and Modern Culture, The Precinct of Religion, The Value and Dignity of Human Life, The Ego and Its Place in the World, The Ground and Goal of Human Life*** and ***The Surge and Thunder-Trends of Civilization and Culture.***

During the later years of his life Professor Shaw devoted himself to several activities outside the sphere of philosophy proper. The chief of these was service to the movement for slum-clearance and better housing. He was Secretary of the National Housing Committee for Congested Areas in 1927 and 1928. After retirement from teaching he became connected with a law firm and was often seen in various courts, where, it is said, he was sometimes confused with the judge because of his magisterial dignity. Included in

his avocations were poetry and pedestrianism; he was proud of the fact that he had on one occasion walked from Philadelphia to New York in 23 hours and 40 minutes.

The passing of Professor Shaw is a sad loss to his many friends and admirers. One's lasting impression of the man is perhaps his cheerfulness, even gaiety, his attitude of sportsmanship, the natural elegance of his mind and language, and the contemporary application he was able to make of the teaching of the classical philosophers.

WILLIAM CURTIS SWABEY

DEWITT HENRY PARKER

DeWitt Henry Parker (April 17, 1885 - June 21, 1949) offered one of the purest examples in our time of devotion to the contemplative life. From his first exposure to philosophy under James, Royce, and Palmer at Harvard, he seems never to have been tempted by any competing ambition. "I have been a university teacher," he wrote, "and I cannot imagine myself being anything else, or wanting to be anything else, or finding anything else more interesting and delightful." Philosophizing, alone or in company, was his chief enjoyment. He did it with such manifest ease and pleasure, and was able to put its results so incisively, that he became one of the most effective philosophic lecturers of his time.

Apart from his work as philosopher and teacher, Parker's life was uneventful. After taking his doctorate at Harvard in 1908, he went to the University of Michigan, where, except for an occasional brief absence, he remained for forty-one years. He was elected president of the Western Division of this Association in 1928, and became chairman of the Michigan department in 1929. He continued his teaching through both world wars, partly because his frail physique was not suited to active service, but partly also because he had frankly avowed doubts whether a world war was not worse than the disease it sought to cure. In politics, he was a strongly convinced liberal. The chief tragedy of his life was the loss in 1938 of his eldest son, fighting in the republican ranks in Spain.

The milestones of Parker's life were his books. The first of these, *The Self and Nature* (1917) was a metaphysical essay in which he defended pluralistic idealism. The second, *The Principles of Aesthetics,* (1920, revised and reissued in 1946) has been a widely used and popular introduction to its subject. The third, *The Analysis of Art* (1926), concluded five or six further years of aesthetic studies and appeared in the same year with a set of lectures he was invited to deliver at the Metropolitan Museum in New York. The fourth, *Human Values* (1931), is a work on ethics in which he supplies not so much a unified philosophy of life as a set of penetrating essays on what he regarded as the great intrinsic goods. His fifth and last book, *Experience and Substance* (1941), developed further the monadic idealism of his first, with valuable new discussions of causality and the theory of relations. This was designed in his own mind as preliminary to a further work on the metaphysics of value, which was well advanced at the time of his death and will probably still be published. These books were marked not only by an increasing penetration of thought, but also by a style distinguished throughout for its precision and its lucidity.

DeWitt Parker was singularly lacking in self-assertiveness, and never made himself a conspicuous figure at meetings of the Association. But he was one of the most respected of American philosophers. Few teachers of philosophy in this country can have had so large and devoted a following among their students, or enjoyed so universal a liking among their colleagues.

C. J. DUCASSE
WILLIAM FRANKENA
BRAND BLANSHARD, *Chairman*

PAUL WINGER SPRAGUE

This Association records with deep regret the death, on May 6, 1948, of Paul

Winger Sprague, professor of philosophy and religion at Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts. In Dr. Sprague's too early death, we have lost a colleague of exceptionally broad and active interests, intellectual acumen, unfeigned enthusiasm for both ideas and human beings, and devotion to his calling as scholar, teacher, and counselor.

He was born on April 18, 1900, the son of a minister in Kansas City, Kansas, and had his early training in nearby schools. After his family moved to the west coast, he studied for his B.A. degree at Pomona College, and was graduated in 1922. In 1925 he received the B.D. degree *cum laude* from Yale University. The next four years he spent as a Congregational minister in Idaho and Washington. In 1929 he returned to Yale as a candidate for the Ph.D. degree, which he received in 1932, for work centered in the philosophy of religion. His dissertation dealt with some theological implications of the theory of emergent evolution, and later was published as a brief monograph.

In 1935-36 he was appointed to the faculty of Wheaton College, and made for himself an extraordinary place in the academic community. His stated responsibilities were in the fields of philosophy and religion, in which he offered a wide range of work. In addition, he revived and developed an earlier enthusiasm for mathematics and astronomy, and worked in close association with his colleagues in the natural sciences. His interest and competence in music found an active outlet in work with the college choir. His wife became director of publicity for the college and he shared directly in her work; while together they made their home a center for both faculty and student life.

During the war, although his health was not robust, Dr. Sprague voluntarily increased his work-load even beyond the usual wartime burden. In 1943, along with his regular duties, he enrolled for more advanced study in mathematics, to fit himself if necessary for technical war work. In the summer of 1944, seeking a still more active role, he applied for appointment as a chaplain in the Navy, and was persuaded to withdraw his application only when the incoming president and the trustees of the college made it clear that they regarded him, and would ask the government to classify him, as an indispensable man.

Paul Sprague made his deepest impression in direct personal association. He published little, but he was incessantly active as keen critic, resourceful teacher, insatiable learner, and whole-hearted participant in the life around him. His philosophy and his religion were both geared to the human scene.

R. L. CALHOUN

HUGO CHRISTIAN MARTIN WENDEL

Hugo Christian Martin Wendel was born in Philadelphia, Pa., April 6, 1884. After several years as a student at the Mt. Airy Seminary, Philadelphia, he went to the University of Erlangen for the year 1907-1908 and to the University of Leipzig for the summer semester, 1908. Returning to America, he entered Princeton University as a junior and graduated, a Phi Beta Kappa man, with the Class of 1910. He taught four years at the Lankenau School for Girls in Philadelphia and then studied on a Harrison Fellowship and later as a Teaching Fellow at the University of Pennsylvania, receiving his Ph.D. degree in 1918. He studied, too, at the Sorbonne, Paris, and at L'Institute des Hautes Etudes Marocaines, Rabat, Morocco, 1925-1926. Wagner College conferred on him the honorary Litt.D. degree in June, 1948.

Dr. Wendel was equally well prepared in history and philosophy. He chose history as his field and was an instructor in that subject at New York University, 1918-1920, and an assistant professor, 1920-1928. He then became professor of history and head of that department at Long Island University, Brooklyn, N.Y., where he remained until his untimely death on January 16, 1949. In his later years, his old love for philosophy reasserted itself and he became a member of this Association.

From 1921 to 1930, Dr. Wendel travelled extensively in Europe and North Africa,

and in the summers of 1925-'27, 1929, and 1930 he lectured under the auspices of the Bureau of University Travel. This part of his career, especially his sojourning in North Africa when on leave from New York University, 1925-'26, is manifested in several of his publications. These were *Evolution of Industrial Freedom in Prussia,* 1945-'49, The New York University Press, 1921; an article on "Democracy in the New German Constitution," which appeared in the *Proceedings* of the History Teachers Association, Middle Atlantic States and Maryland, 1920; another on "The Mediterranean Menace," published in the *Proceedings* of the same Association, 1927; and The Protégé System in Morocco," *The Journal of Modern History,* 1930. He was the author, too, of various book reviews.

Dr. Wendel was vice-president of the Board of Education of the United Lutheran Church, 1926-'32; member of the Board of Education of the United Lutheran Synod, 1944—; member of the Board of Directors of the Mt. Airy Seminary, 1934-1940; member of the International Law Seminar of the Carnegie Endowment at the University of Michigan, summer of 1936; Major, the United States Army Reserves, attached to the research staff, Army War College, Washington, D.C., 1924-'34; and presented a confidential report on Morocco for the United States Department of State in connection with World War II.

Dr. Wendel was a polished gentleman, kindly and courteous in all his dealings with his students. He filled a large place in the life of Long Island University from almost its inception; his memory will linger with both students and colleagues. His significance for that institution in its formative period will become more and more apparent as the years lengthen.

GREGORY D. WALCOTT

The greetings and good wishes of The Indian Philosophical Congress, which will celebrate its Silver Jubilee in December, 1950, were given to the American Philosophical Association by Professor P. T. Raju, of the Asia Institute. Professor Raju extended the cordial invitation of the Congress to attend its meetings.

The Secretary reported that there are 702 members of the Eastern Division.

The following report was presented by Lewis W. Beck on behalf of the Committee on Information Service:

During the past year there was a notable decrease in the number of positions open in philosophy, and a slight increase in the number of available teachers. But on the whole, the supply of teachers seems only slightly in excess of the demand, and the Committee knows of very few cases of actual unemployment among those registered with it. Some of the positions which became open were not referred to the Committee, apparently because a large number of candidates were (quite prudently) applying for positions early in the year, and the appointing officers did not feel the need of having additional candidates. In about half the cases in which nominations were requested, financial and other considerations prevented any appointments from being made, even though the appointing officers stated that the candidates suggested by the Committee were entirely satisfactory. The Committee feels that colleges during the year underestimated their needs and failed to make a sufficient number of new appointments; we believe that there may be some slight increase in the number of appointments made next year. (We may report that at present the Committee has before it a number of requests for nominations for appointments to take effect at the beginning of the second semester of this year.)

As a result of all these factors, the Committee placed only seven of its candidates, compared to the 29 of the preceding year and the 18 of the year before that.

In view of this very modest showing, some of the members of the Committee were inclined to recommend that the Committee be discharged. Others felt that the very

difficulty of the situation made its continuance especially desirable, however poor the statistics of its performance might be. The questino was widely discussed at the Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy at Cleveland in October, and it seemed to be the unanimous sentiment that the work should be continued. The letters from candidates and appointing officers seemed very much in favor of continuing the work. These considerations have led at least a majority of the Committee members to favor continuation.

The Committee is convinced that it will be able to aid in the appointment of a larger number of instructors and assistant professors if a larger number of doctoral candidates will register with the Committee as a matter of course. We believe that an incidental effect of such a policy would be to establish the Committee better in the minds of appointing officers, so that we should have more success in trying to fill the comparatively small number of vacancies which occur on the senior professorial levels and which are now filled without the systematic survey of the field that the Committee can give.

The Western Division named Professor Lewis E. Hahn to the Committee, replacing Dean Wayne A. R. Leys.

Statistical Summary

Number of candidates	245
Number of requests for nominations	57
Number of appointments actually made (estimate)	30
Number of appointments made to Committee nominees	7

Financial Summary

Receipts

Balance, 1948	$ 29.12*
From Eastern Division	150.00
From Western Division	50.00
From Pacific Division	50.00
Total	$279.12

*Erroneously reported at last meeting as $16.12.

Expenditures

Printing	$ 68.00
Secretarial help	63.80
Travel	35.26
Postage, telegraph and telephone	49.49
Bank charges	4.51
Total	$221.06
Balance	$ 58.06

Recommendations

1. The Committee recommends that it be continued for at least one year.
2. The Committee requests the following appropriations for 1950:

From Eastern Division	$110.00
From Western Division	60.00
From Pacific Division	30.00
Total	$200.00

These figures are based on an estimated expense of about $250.00.

The distribution of these requested appropriations is approximately correlated with the distribution of membership among the various divisions. On May 20, 1949, a calculation was made of the *pro rata* share of each Division in the expenses of the pre-

ceding two years. This was sent to the Secretary of each Division, but the Committee decided not to make a cash settlement at that time since the expenses were continuing. The appropriations requested will do much to make the expenses of the Committee rest on each Division in a more equitable way than has been the case in the past.

3. The Committee recommends that if and when the reorganization of the Association takes place, the Committee be made an agency of the Association as a whole instead of an agency of *ad hoc* cooperation among the Divisions.

4. The Committee recommends that thought be given to the desirability of enlarging both the membership and the scope of the work of the Committee. At least a majority of the Committee feels that it might be desirable for the Committee to make an attempt to aid in expanding the field of philosophic instruction through encouraging administrations to establish departments of philosophy in colleges and schools where they do not now exist.

The report of the Publication Committee was read by Harold A. Larrabee. The report of the Bibliography Committee was presented by Herbert W. Schneider.

Cornelius Krusé, Chairman of the Committee on International Cultural Cooperation, referred to the East-West Philosophers' Conference, which took place from June 20 to July 29, 1949, in Honolulu, Hawaii, under the auspices of the University of Hawaii. The purpose of this Conference, to which ten philosophers from the mainland and ten from Asia had been invited, was to study the possibility of a world philosophy through a synthesis of the ideas and ideals of the East and the West. Twenty-four associate members, for the most part younger professors of philosophy from the mainland, also participated in these discussions, which lasted six weeks, and the Proceedings of which will soon be published. Reference was also made to the hope and expectation that an East-West philosophical quarterly would soon be launched. Professor Raju's presence at the meeting of the Eastern Division was noted as one of the first fruits of the Conference.

It was then suggested that the Eastern Division send greetings to the Third Inter-American Congress of Philosophy which will take place from January 11th to 20th in Mexico City. This suggestion was heartily approved, and Cornelius Krusé was instructed to convey these greetings to the South American colleagues.

Reference was also made to the Association's grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, which makes it possible for the Association to subsidize in part the coming of visiting professors from Latin America to colleges and universities in this country. Anyone interested was asked to communicate with the Chairman of this Committee.

At the invitation of Professor Morrow, delegate of the Association to the American Council of Learned Societies, Cornelius Krusé gave a brief report of the present activities of the Council. Reference was made to the extended Russian translation project for books and articles appearing in periodicals which was now being carried on under the joint auspices of the Council and the Social Science Research Council. It was emphasized that more and more the two Councils just mentioned, and the American Council on Education and the National Research Council, found it in their common and mutual interest to cooperate with each other. The Fulbright screening program for post-doctoral applicants, for example, is carried on jointly by these four Councils. Members of the business meeting were told of the old and new fellowship programs of the Council. It was re-

quested that members of the Association should bring to the attention of the Council graduate students of promise who might be considered for a pre-doctoral fellowship. The Council is particularly interested in recruiting from senior classes students of promise who might otherwise not find it possible to receive further training in humanistic disciplines.

The Nominating Committee (Grace A. de Laguna, Chairman, Charles W. Hendel, and Ernest Nagel) presented the following nominations: for President, Arthur L. Murphy; for Vice-President, Willard V. Quine; for members of the Executive Committee, Richard B. Brandt (1952) and H. T. Costello (1952). All were elected by unanimous vote.

The following recommendations of the Executive Committee were adopted:

That the following applicants be elected to full membership: Ethel Albert, Robert E. Bass, Huntington Cairns, Constantine P. Cavarnos, Marie Christodoulou, George A. Clark, Robert S. Cohen, Thurston N. Davis, Cornelius M. De Boe, Robert E. Dewey, Joseph F. Donceel, Willis Doney, Douglas P. Dryer, Richard W. Eastwood, Lyne Starling Few, Peter Fireman, John V. Flynn, Carl J. Friedrich, Wesley Northridge Haines, Samuel L. Hart, Robert J. Hartman, M. Heitzman, Albert LeRoy Hilliard, John Justus Hartnack, Theodore E. James, Walter T. James, Graham M. Jamieson, Hans Jonas, Marc Edmund Jones, Joseph Katz, Mother Louise Keyes, Frank A. MacDonald, Geddes MacGregor, Robert Charles Marsh, F. David Martin, Arthur Raymond McKay, Emmanuel G. Mesthene, Carl Michalson, Robert D. Miller, José Ferrater Mora, Sidney Morganbesser, George Nakhnikian, David Havens Newhall, James Willard Oliver, Virginia Onderdonk, Francis H. Parker, Sheldon Paul Peterfreund, Edward Pols, P. T. Raju, R. Paul Ramsey, Anibal Sanchez Reulet, John M. Robinson, Beatrice K. Rome, Mary Carman Rose, Culbert G. Rutenber, David Savan, Paul Siwek, Morton Smith, Murray Jerome Stolnitz, Samuel E. Stumpf, Harry Tarter, Horace Standish Thayer, John McCraig Thorburn, Colin Murray Turbayne, Christian Egbert Weber, Edgar Franklin Wells, Benjamin Wolstein, John P. Wynne.

That the following be elected to associate membership: Alfred J. Asgis, William Bryar, Henry Lamar Crosby, Richard C. Gilman, Chadbourne Gilpatric, José Arduin Gomez-Mier, Frederick W. Hooper, Walter T. James, C. Murray Keefer, Richard Kuhns, John Wesley Robb, Robert Roelofs, Martin H. Scharlemann, Samuel I. Shuman, Sten H. Stenson, Richard C. Taylor, Wallace I. Wolverton.

That the following be transferred from associate to full membership: Mrs. Rosamond Kent Sprague.

That the Eastern Division accept the invitation of the University of Toronto to hold the next meeting at Toronto, Canada.

The Executive Committee recommended acceptance of the plan for reorganization of the American Philosophical Association, embodied in the Proposed Constitution for the American Philosophical Association. President Stace thanked the Secretary, who had acted as chairman of the Committee on Reorganization, for his work on the document. It was moved, seconded, and voted unanimously that the Proposed Constitution be "adopted in principle." The Proposed Constitution, which was distributed in mimeographed form to the

Division before the Business Meeting, will be found in this number of the *Proceedings,* in the Report of the National Secretary (pp. 75-77).

The Executive Committee called a special meeting of the Eastern Division for December 28, for a preliminary discussion of four resolutions presented by H. D. Aiken, Brand Blanshard, Abraham Edel, Marvin Farber, John Goheen, Yervant H. Krikorian, Arthur E. Murphy, and John H. Randall, Jr. Resolutions I, II, IV had been endorsed by the Executive Committee; Resolution III was not endorsed by the Committee. The discussion of the Resolutions was continued at the regular Business Meeting. The Resolutions, as amended and with the vote of the meeting appearing in parentheses, follow:

AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION
Eastern Division

January 13, 1950

I. WHEREAS the democratic operation of our Association entails equality of treatment for all members, which is not provided by meetings at places where there is racial segregation;

BE IT RESOLVED THAT meetings of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association not be held at colleges or universities where it is impossible to provide non-segregated accommodations.

(Endorsed, majority vote)

II. WHEREAS it is the professional responsibility of philosophy teachers to seek and teach the truth; and

WHEREAS there has been increasing pressure in many areas against minority or dissenting opinion; and

WHEREAS this pressure operates in institutions of higher education to prevent free inquiry into unpopular opinions and to use of the criterion of conformity in judging teachers; and

WHEREAS the development of uniformity of thought enforced by legal or economic penalties or intimidation would make it impossible for philosophers to fulfill their professional duties;

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association reaffirm the professional duty and the right of philosophers to examine and express their independent evaluation of any form of philosophical thought whatsoever, no matter what the bearings of that philosophy on controversial issues of social policy.

(Endorsed unanimously)

III. WHEREAS there have been widespread attacks upon the freedom of teachers to exercise their civil rights, as evidenced in dismissals, loyalty oaths, special legislation for inquiries into teachers, vilification of individuals in newspapers and magazines;

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Executive Committee of the Eastern Division set up a committee of three on Academic Freedom, empowered and directed to receive complaints of infringement of academic freedom of members of the Association or of their dismissal or discrimination against them on the grounds of the exercise of their civil rights; to cooperate with investigations by other responsible bodies; to assist in the attempt to right any injustice by resolution, publicity, and participation in legal action *amicus curiae.*

(Not endorsed; majority vote)

IV. WHEREAS the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association by *unanimous* vote adopted the following resolution and instructed its secretary to transmit it to President Raymond B. Allen of the University of Washington: "That the members of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association express their confidence in the integrity, as man and teacher, of Professor Herbert J. Phillips of the

Department of Philosophy of the University of Washington, and affirm their strong conviction that membership, or non-membership, in a legal political party is not itself sufficient grounds for determining fitness for academic employment." (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1948-49, pp. 477-78)

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association endorses the principle embodied in the resolution of the Pacific Division that an individual teacher be judged in terms of his own actions and not in terms of the action of others.

(Endorsed by vote of 75 to 20)

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association call upon the University of Washington to reconsider its decision in the case of Professor Phillips in the light of this principle and of the expressed judgment of those of his professional colleagues best qualified to pass on his professional integrity.

(Endorsed by vote of 91 to 7)

It was voted, in view of their importance, that the Resolutions be submitted to the entire membership of the Eastern Division for Mail-vote and that the mail-vote be conclusive.[1]

The following motion by Glenn R. Morrow, as adopted unanimously: "Mr. Chairman, I am sure it has been a special pleasure for all of us to meet at this university, which has recently come under the presidential guidance of one of our own professional colleagues. I move that the Division express to President and Mrs. Jefferson and to Clark University its very deep appreciation of the generous and gracious hospitality we have enjoyed here during the past three days."

MILTON C. NAHM, *Secretary-Treasurer*

PACIFIC DIVISION

President: Hugh Miller
Vice-President: E. W. Strong
Secretary-Treasurer: Herbert L. Searles
Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and Paul Marhenke *ex officio* for one year, James L. Jarrett, Jr. (1950), A. Kaplan (1951), and Isabel Hungerland (1951).

The twenty-third annual meeting of the Pacific Division was held at Mills College, Oakland, California on December 27, 28 and 29, 1949. The following program was presented:

Logic and the Concept of Entailment ..... Arthur Pap
Is Logic Philosophy? ..... Maria Reichenbach
A Note on Value Statements ..... Nathaniel Lawrence
The Measurement of Value ..... Norman C. Dalkey
The Aesthetic Theory and Practice of Jean-Paul Sartre ..... Catherine Rau
A Criticism of the "Empirio-Criticism" ..... Alexander Maslow
Russell versus Hume ..... Arthur J. Benson
Dewey's Socrates ..... Philip Merlan

[1]The results of the mail-vote follow: Resolution I: Endorsed, 355 to 27. Resolution II: Endorsed, 372 to 9. Resolution III: Not Endorsed, 137 to 229. Resolution IV: Endorsed, 297 to 71.

Individualism, Collectivism, and Levels of Integration.....Melvin Rader
The Moral Principle: A Criticism of Utilitarianism.....Henry N. Wieman
Some Principles of Philosophical Synthesis.....W. I. Matson
The Presidential Address: The Criterion of Significance....Paul Marhenke
The Hidden Synthetic *A Priori* behind C. I. Lewis' Analytic *A Priori*.....Arthur B. Fallicó
Notes on Designation, Meaning and Necessity.....Paul D. Wienpahl
Pro Patria mori in Medieval Political Theory.....Ernst H. Kantorowicz
Logic and History.....Hugh Miller

The Pacific Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy held its annual meeting on the evening of December 26 and the morning of December 27 with members of the Pacific Division in attendance. At the evening meeting a symposium and discussion on The Teaching of Aesthetics was participated in by Bertram E. Jessup, James L. Jarrett, Jr., Richard C. Tansey and Rannie Baker. At the morning session there was a general discussion without special papers on the Problems of the Teaching of Philosophy.

A Joint Luncheon with the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association was held on Thursday, December 29. Ernst H. Kantorowicz spoke representing History and Hugh Miller was the speaker representing Philosophy.

The annual business meeting of the Division was held Thursday, December 29 from 10:00 to 11:30 a.m., with President Marhenke presiding.

A motion to approve the minutes of the last meeting was carried.

The Treasurer's report was read and approved as follows:

Receipts:

Balance on hand December 20, 1948:	
War Bonds	$ 296.00
Savings Account	300.00
Commercial Account	241.26
Total	$ 837.26
Interest on Savings	1.50
Membership Dues	254.00
Total	$1,092.76

Expenditures:

Mimeographing abstracts 22nd annual meeting	$ 38.98
Executive committee postage	2.57
A.P.A. Treasury, International Federation dues	2.95
A.P.A. Information Service, L. W. Beck	50.00
Printing dues notices (3 year supply)	7.25
Printing letterheads	8.02
Postage and supplies (dues notices)	12.30
Secretarial expense, etc. (1948)	21.84
Burns Printing Service, nomination blanks	8.19
A.P.A. Treasury, 1949 dues	61.50
A.P.A. Treasury, *Proceedings,* 1948-9	136.64
Secretarial expense, 1949	10.00
Mimeographing and mailing announcements of 23rd annual meeting	9.47
Bank charges	1.81
Total	$ 371.52

Balance on hand, December 20, 1949

War Bonds	$ 296.00
Savings account	301.50
Commercial account	123.74
Total	$ 721.24

Audited by David Rynin — HERBERT L. SEARLES, *Treasurer*

The following officers nominated by the Executive committee were elected: President, Hugh Miller; Vice-President, E. W. Strong; Executive Committee members, A. Kaplan and Isabel Hungerland, for two years.

The application of the Southwestern Philosophical Conference for admission into the American Philosophical Association was approved.

The recommendation of the Executive Committee that the Division accept the invitation to hold the twenty-fourth annual meeting at the University of California at Berkeley was approved.

The annual report of the Publication Committee was read by the Secretary in the absence of committee member George P. Adams.

A report of the activities of the committee on Information Service was made by Paul Marhenke, and a vote of confidence in the committee was passed.

Upon recommendation of the Executive Committee the following were elected to Active Membership: Alburey Castell, Norman C. Dalkey, Herbert Fingarette, Wallace I. Matson, Noel F. Mottershead, Manuel Olguin, Maria Reichenbach, and Donald A. Wells.

Elected to Associate Membership were: Frank Hinman Jr., Peter Remnant and Merritt M. Thompson.

Advanced from Associate to Active Membership were: Donald Kalish and Winfield Nagley.

A brief report on the East-West Conference was made by W. R. Dennes, representing the committee on International Cultural Cooperation.

The proposed Constitution for The American Philosophical Association was discussed. A motion to reject the proposal was carried. The following motion was then proposed and carried: That the Pacific Division express its willingness to grant such additional powers to the National Board as may be necessary to realize the essential ends for which the reorganization plan was devised.

A motion by Donald A. Piatt, that the Pacific Division express its appreciation to Mills College, The Department of Philosophy and other personnel, for the gracious hospitality and services provided at its twenty-third annual meeting, was approved.

The following memorial notice was read, adopted, and ordered printed in the *Proceedings:*

EDWARD OCTAVIUS SISSON

In the death of Edward Octavius Sisson in January, 1949, at Carmel, California, the Pacific Division loses one of its oldest and most respected members and a former president. He was born in 1869 at Gateshead, England, the eighth son and the ninth child of his father's seventeen children. During his childhood his family migrated to Eastern Kansas where he grew up. His college years were spent at the Kansas State College where he was graduated Bachelor of Science in 1886. After teaching in the

public schools for five years, he enrolled as a student at the University of Chicago on the first day of its opening in 1891 and came under the tutelage of the famous original faculty of this great university. Amongst these he particularly honored the memory of Professor Paul Shorey. Taking the A.B. at Chicago in 1892 he continued for some ten years his career as a teacher and administrator .He was the first director of the Bradley Polytechnic Institute in Peoria, Illinois. Thus early in his long and varied career, Professor Sisson began to display the executive and administrative ability with which he so ably served various institutions for many years. The academic year 1903-04 saw him at the University of Berlin where he was a student and friend of Paulsen. Here he also undertook the study of Protestant religious education in the schools of Prussia on which he based his dissertation for the Ph.D. at Harvard in 1905. Thereafter he occupied chairs of Education at the University of Illinois, the University of Washington, and at Reed College. He left Reed to serve as Commissioner of Education of the state of Idaho from 1913 to 1917. The area of supervision here included all state-supported schools from the elementary to the university as well as the schools for the mentally and physically handicapped. This work led to his selection for the presidency of the State University of Montana in 1917. As his interests turned more and more toward philosophy and back to teaching, he returned to Reed in 1921 as Professor of Philosophy and Education, from which posts he retired in 1939. Other events in his career included visiting professorships in Education at Harvard and the University of California, participation in the work of the Schools of Philosophy of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and after retirement from Reed, work in adult education at Carmel, a visiting professorship at the San Jose State College and again one year at Reed in 1945-46. He was awarded the Sc.D. by the Kansas State College, the LL.D. by the State University of Montana and by Reed College.

The Reed faculty of the twenties which developed under its memorable president, Richard F. Scholz, the unique curriculum and character for which it is now widely known, is difficult to imagine without the energetic, humane Professor Sisson. After Scholtz's untimely death in 1924, Professor Sisson participated for a time with others in the work of the interim acting presidency of the college.

Professor Sisson's pragmatism in philosophy bore witness especially to his keen comprehension of the revolution in practice which Dewey's polemic called for. As a practical educator at every level of the system, he knew its value as a creed as well as a theory. Never one to be left behind as his years advanced, he followed new directions as they opened up especially in his later years the philosophy of language. His published works include several volumes on educational topics, such as *The Essentials of Character* and *Educating for Freedom*, articles in philosophical and other journals and scattered publications of his numerous public addresses.

A full appreciation of Professor Sisson must be based not only on his work as a philosopher but also as an educator and educationist though the two main aspects of his career were in a sense inseparable. As a philosopher of education he was everywhere the critic of the specious scientism that has often eclipsed in this field the truth that a fundamental reflection on the ends of education must precede all pedagogical technicalities of mensuration and parochial legality. Recollection of Professor Sisson's career stimulates the hope that others, and especially philosophers, may again regard the education of citizens of a democracy as a worthy subject of philosophical reflection and that it may possess the breadth and sympathetic human understanding which so admirably characterized his attention to these problems as well as many others.

KARL ASCHENBRENNER
EDWIN GARLAN
S. KERBY-MILLER
HERBERT L. SEARLES, *Secretary-Treasurer*

WESTERN DIVISION

Officers (1949-1950)

President: Albert E. Avey
Vice-President: D. W. Gotshalk
Secretary-Treasurer: Lewis E. Hahn
Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and A. C. Garnett, Everett W. Hall, and Merritt H. Moore.

Newly Elected Oficers (1950-1951)

President: D. W. Gotshalk
Vice-President: Richard McKeon
Secretary-Treasurer: Lewis E. Hahn
Executive Committee: The foregoing officers and Merritt H. Moore (1951), Everett W. Hall (1952), and Van Meter Ames (1953).

The forty-eighth annual meeting of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association was held at the University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, May 4, 5, and 6, 1950.

The following program was presented:

Thursday Afternoon, May 4

Session on Metaphysics and Theory of Knowledge
(Chairman, Merritt H. Moore)
The Confusion over Nominalism.....Campbell Crockett
A Contextual Evaluation of Aristotle's Conception of Nature.....John J. Fitzgerald
Absolute Truth, Relative Reality, and Meaningful Events.A. G. Ramsperger
Session on Value Theory (Chairman, A. C. Garnett)
Objectivity and Creativity as Characters of Dewey's Valuation Judgments.....Robert W. Browning
On the Diversity of Methods in Dewey's Ethical Theory.....Marvin Fox
Some Neglected Considerations of Pleasure and Pain.George K. Plochmann

Thursday Evening, May 4

Informal Comments on the 1949 East-West Philosophers' Conference by George P. Conger.

Friday Morning, May 5

General Session on Existentialism (Chairman, Eliseo Vivas)
Metaphysics and Existentialism.....Paul L. Holmer
The Implications of Existentialism for Ethics.....Marjorie Grene
The Implications of Kierkegaard's Thought for Existentialism.....Curtis W. R. Larson
Existentialism and the Arts.....Van Meter Ames

Friday Afternoon

Session on Logic and Philosophy of Analysis (Chairman, Virgil C. Aldrich)
Levels of Analysis.....Virgil Hinshaw, Jr.
On Using Inverted Commas.....Leonard Linsky
Counter-Intuitivity and the Method of Analysis.....Richard Rudner
Session on Ethics and Social Philosophy (Chairman, Everett W. Hall)
Anthropomorphism and Physicomorphism read for Walter Cerf by.....L. D. MacDonald

A Naturalistic Utilitarianism.....Ian McGreal
Is Loyalty to Democracy Philosophically Justifiable?.....Cecil H. Miller

Friday Evening

Annual dinner with Vice-President D. W. Gotshalk presiding
Welcome to the Association.....Dean Theodore C. Blegen
Presidential Address: Truth and Falsehood—
Mostly Falsehood.....Albert E. Avey

Saturday, May 6

General Session on Problems of World Society and World Government
(Chairman, Richard McKeon)
Is Philosophy Relevant to World Affairs?.....George R. Geiger
Ethical Agreement and World Peace.....Cornelius L. Golightly
The Relevance of Ethics to Problems of World Society
and Government.....Wayne A. R. Leys

The following members served as critics: Estelle Allen DeLacy, Warner A. Wick, David L. Miller, William Frankena, Ray Lepley, Gardner Williams, Gustav Bergmann, Paul Henle, J. L. Cobitz, Lauchlin D. MacDonald, Lucius Garvin, and Willis Moore.

President Avey presided over the Business Session which followed the discussion of problems of world society and world government.

The first item of business was the election of new members. The following nominees were elected to full membership in the association: Linde Ahrens, Enrique D. Almeida, Roger W. Barrett, E. Holmes Bearden, Ina A. Bolton, Francis W. Brush, Milic Capec, Theodore Celms, Russell J. Compton, Earl C. Cunningham, Margaret Dengler, J. Edward Dirks, Leonard A. Duce, John H. Faurot, Thomas F. Freeman, John G. Gill, Robert J. Henle, Anthony M. Mardiros, Ethan T. Mengers, Francis M. Meyers, Raymond H. Palmer, Emerson W. Shideler, Boleslav Sobocinski, and Thomas A. Vanatta. The following nominees were elected to associate membership in the association: James W. Clark, Arthur J. Dibden, Peter Glassen, Milton Greenwald, Clifford Hanson, William H. Harris, John G. Kramer, Curtis W. R. Larson, Hugh S. Moorhead, Jr., George K. Plochmann, and William N. Webb. Associate member Lauchlin D. MacDonald was elected to full membership.

The Treasurer's Report was approved as follows:

April 30, 1949 to April 22, 1950

Receipts:	
Balance on hand, April 30, 1949	$ 183.03
Dues collected to April 22, 1950	1,051.10
Total	$1,234.13
Expenditures:	
National dues and Proceedings	$ 604.26
Newsletter expense	107.26
International Federation dues	9.33
Committee on Information Service	100.00
Stationery	24.95
Smoker	20.00

Printing	55.85
Program Committee Travel Expense	23.79
Telephone and Telegraph	9.69
Postage	50.13
Total	$1,005.26
Balance on hand, April 22, 1950	$ 228.87

LEWIS E. HAHN, *Secretary-Treasurer*

(Wayne A. R. Leys, of the Committee on Auditing, reported that as of May 5, 1950 the "accounts are in good order and are reconciled with bank balance and checks on hand.")

D. W. Gotshalk was elected president by acclamation. For Vice-President the Nominating Committee nominated Richard McKeon, Philip B. Rice, and W. H. Werkmeister; and Richard McKeon was elected to this office. According to the rules adopted in 1948, he will succeed to the presidency a year hence. Lewis E. Hahn was nominated for Secretary-Treasurer and was elected. Van Meter Ames was nominated for member of the Executive Committee and was elected.

The Division voted to continue to cooperate with the Committee on Information (Vacancies and Available Personnel) and authorized payment of its share toward the expenses of the Committee.

The Division voted to continue the Newsletter for another year under the editorship of Willis Moore and voted its thanks to Professor Moore for the fine job done this year.

After hearing the report of the Publications Committee, the Division voted to accept the Executive Committee recommendations that the Division pledge to pay to the revolving fund of the Publications Committee $100 when and as funds permit. In connection with publications, it should be noted that henceforth the Proceedings are to be published separately rather than in the *Philosophical Review* and that members should check to make sure that their respective university libraries receive copies of them.

After a good deal of discussion, the Division voted to support in principle the plan approved by the Eastern Division last December for reorganizing the American Philosophical Association but expressed the hope that a reorganization proposal on which all three divisions can agree can be worked out.

In view of the fact that next year Northwestern University is celebrating its centennial, the Division voted to accept its invitation to meet there May 3, 4, and 5, 1951.

The Division voted to welcome the newly organized Western Conference on the Teaching of Philosophy to meet at the same place and to assist it in securing facilities for a meeting a little ahead of our regular meetings.

The Southwestern Philosophical Conference application for divisional status was tabled for further study of the mutual advantages and disadvantages for the Western Division and the Conference of making such a change.

The following memorial notices were presented:

DeWitt Henry Parker, 1885-1949. (For this memorial, see Minutes of Eastern Division).

GEORGE THOMAS WHITE PATRICK

Professor George Thomas White Patrick died on May 21, 1949 after a long and full life that might not inaptly be described as that of a pioneer. Although his last years were spent in Palo Alto, California, where he was still active in promoting the cause of philosophy and the social sciences both through correspondence with influential people and by means of articles in popular magazines, his life work must be identified with the Middle West and specifically with Iowa.

Born on a farm in New Hampshire in 1857, Professor Patrick gained acquaintance with the Middle West during four years of undergraduate studies at the State University of Iowa. In these years (1874-8) the State University of Iowa was definitely a pioneering venture in higher education, and no doubt something of the challenge of bringing cultural stimulus and specifically of philosophical inquiry to students who had so little in the way of intellectual opportunity must have entered his blood at this time. After three years devoted to mining ventures in Colorado, Professor Patrick entered the Yale Divinity School. After three years of graduate study at Yale he entered Johns Hopkins University where he came under the influence of G. Stanley Hall, under whose guidance he received his Ph.D. in 1888. The year previous to this he had accepted a call to return to his Alma Mater as Professor and Head of the Department of Mental and Moral Science and Didactics, later to be known as the Department of Philosophy and Psychology.

Thus we find even before the last decade of the nineteenth century that a psychological laboratory and a graduate seminar in psychology were introduced to Iowa through the leadership of G. T. W. Patrick. Although the work in psychology was later taken over by Carl E. Seashore, Patrick always retained interest in the subject, publishing books and articles showing a psychological bent almost to his last years. Moreover, Professor Patrick's scientific interests were not restricted to psychology. As those who have used his introductory textbook are aware, he was interested in exploring the relations of philosophy to science generally and advocated that the philosopher should keep in close touch with scientific developments. This was an innovation in the Middle West, where the traditional connection had been between philosophy and religion. His impress in this respect upon the development of philosophy at Iowa is still felt.

Although the importance of Professor Patrick's writings is not to be underestimated (he was the author of seven books and the translator of another, as well as having some fifty-seven articles and reviews to his credit), it is as a teacher that he probably made his most lasting impression. Although it is more than twenty years since he was engaged in active teaching, evidences of his effectiveness in that capacity are still available at Iowa. Philosophy in the Middle West owes a great debt to the pioneering labors of G. T. W. Patrick.

EVERETT W. HALL

The following resolutions, which were approved in virtually the same form by the Eastern Division, were introduced and adopted by vote of the Western Division:

I. WHEREAS the democratic operation of our Association entails equality of treatment for all members, which is not provided by meetings at places where there is racial segregation;

BE IT RESOLVED THAT meetings of the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association not be held at colleges or universities where it is impossible to provide non-segregated accommodations.

II. WHEREAS it is the professional responsibility of philosophy teachers to seek and teach the truth; and

WHEREAS there has been increasing pressure in many areas against minority or dissenting opinion; and

WHEREAS this pressure operates in institutions of higher education to prevent free inquiry into unpopular opinions and to use of the criterion of conformity in judging teachers; and

WHEREAS the development of uniformity of thought enforced by legal or economic penalties or intimidation would make it impossible for philosophers to fulfill their professional duties;

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association reaffirm the professional duty and the right of philosophers to examine and express their independent evaluation of any form of philosophical thought whatsoever, no matter what the bearings of that philosophy on controversial issues of social policy.

III. WHEREAS the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association by *unanimous* vote adopted the following resolutions and instructed its secretary to transmit it to President Raymond B. Allen of the University of Washington: "That the members of the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association express their confidence in the integrity, as man and teacher, of Professor Herbert J. Phillips of the Department of Philosophy of the University of Washington, and affirm their strong conviction that membership, or non-membership, in a legal political party is not itself sufficient grounds for determining fitness for academic employment." (Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association, 1948-49, pp. 477-78)

BE IT RESOLVED THAT the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association endorses the principle that an individual teacher be judged in terms of his own actions and not in terms of the action of others.

BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED THAT the Western Division of the American Philosophical Association call upon the University of Washington to reconsider its decision in the case of Professor Phillips in the light of this principle and of the expressed judgment of those of his professional colleagues best qualified to pass on his profsesional integrity.

Last year the following resolutions were referred to the Executive Committee for further study: (1) "The Executive Committee is directed to receive information regarding cases of alleged violation of academic freedom, and to be of such assistance as possible in helping members to retain their positions or to secure new positions"; and (2) as a substitute for (1), "The Executive Committee is empowered to investigate any cases of violation of academic freedom, to cooperate with other organizations in making such investigations, and to report facts and recommendations to the division." After making a study of these resolutions and noting that the Eastern Division had voted down a motion to set up an investigating committee on Academic Freedom, the Executive Committee reported that constituting itself a clearing house or investigating committee under these circumstances would constitute an unnecessary duplication of the activities of the American Association of University Professors and might embarrass the latter to our mutual disadvantage. It therefore reported that, though it favored offering such assistance as it could to members under attack on the score of academic freedom, it seemed inadvisable at present to set itself up as an investigating committee. The division voted to accept the report.

The following resolution was adopted by unanimous vote: "Be it resolved that the Western Division express and record its deep appreciation of the hospitality of the University of Minnesota on the occasion of the forty-eighth meeting of the division, and that the division further express and record its appreciation of the work of the local committee on arrangements."

LEWIS E. HAHN, *Secretary-Treasurer*

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(Addresses are given in the list of members)

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